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SQUARE WHEELS:
U.S. PASS-THROUGH TAXATION
OF PRIvATELY HELD ENTERPRISES
IN A COMPARATIVE LAW CONTEXT

Ann F. Thomas'
I.

INTRODUCTION

To an observer of current trends in the taxation of business enterprises
in the United States, this symposium's consideration of enterprise structures
in a comparative law context is particularly provocative. The United States
is in the midst of a quiet revolution in the taxation of privately held
businesses. I For decades, the United States has maintained a classical,
two-tier tax system for corporations while much of the rest of the world
moved toward integrated taxation of corporate distributions. Now, U.S. tax
policy is promoting a much more radical alternative to the double tax:

* Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School; A.B., 1973 Radcliffe College;
J.D., 1976 Yale Law School. The author wishes to express her thanks to Richard C. E.
Beck, Sydney M. Cone, III, Aleta G. Estreicher, William LaPiana, Saul Levmore, and
Richard O. Loengard, lr. who read an earlier version of this article, and to Karen Gross
for many readings and extensive comments. Research assistant Susan McCarter and the
library staff at New York Law School deserve special mention for their tireless assistance.
1. The term "privately held" as used in this article means a business that is not publicly
traded within the meaning of Section 7704 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended [hereinafter the Code or the I.R.C.]. Section 7704 defines a publicly traded
interest as one that is traded on an established securities exchange or is readily tradeable
on a secondary market. The term "privately held" as used in this article encompasses both
businesses in which the principal equity owners are actively involved in management
(conventionally referred to as closely held businesses) as well as businesses in which
passive investors are a significant feature and management is centralized. See ROBERT W.
HAMILTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN BUSINESS 342-43 (Little Brown and Co. 1989);
HARM-JAN DE KLUVIER, Europe and the Private Company, An Introduction, in THE
EUROPEAN PRIVATE COMPANY? 21, 23-24 (Harm-Jan De Kluvier & Walter Van Gerven
eds., 1995).
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pass-through taxation for all privately held enterprises, regardless of
business form.
Changes in Treasury regulations and amendments to the Internal
Revenue Code2 made in 1996 went very far toward establishing passthrough taxation as the norm for U.S. business entities that are not publicly
traded, including most corporations and the new U.S. limited liability
companies. The pass-through model treats the entity as transparent for tax
purposes and taxes the equity owners directly on the income (and losses)
of the enterprise. 3 A survey of tax classification patterns in six of the
transitional and emerging market countries represented in the symposium
(Argentina, Hungary, Mexico, Romania, South Africa and South Korea)
and in four major trading partner countries (France, Germany, Japan and
the United Kingdom) suggests that the new emphasis in the United States
on this business tax model is an unusual choice.
This article is a preliminary effort to locate the new norms in U.S.
business taxation in the comparative law context. It focuses on the
structural issue of entity classification, which is the traditional form in
which the question of taxation of privately held businesses has been framed
in the United States. While preliminary in nature, the findings from this
comparative law survey are rather striking in light of the current trends in
U.S. tax law.
In all but one of the countries surveyed, the pass-through model is
seen to have quite a minor role structurally in the taxation of privately held
business entities. Among the transitional and emerging market countries
included in the symposium, pass-through taxation is only applied to
business forms of marginal importance or narrowly restricted ownership,
if it is used at all in the taxation of entities. In the four trading partner
countries also surveyed, whose industrialized economies and mature tax
systems are more comparable to the circumstances of the United States, a
similar pattern is seen. With the exception of Germany, which does give
pass-through taxation a broader role, in the other three mature tax systems
pass-through taxation is again found to apply to a narrow range of business
forms or on a restricted basis. In all ten of the countries, privately held
limited liability companies and limited stock companies are treated as
corporate taxpayers. The prevailing pattern in the taxation of privately held
business entities in all the countries surveyed is not pass-through but
corporate taxation. In most instances, the corporate tax is not a full double
2. All references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, unless
otherwise noted.
3. For a fuller description of pass-through taxation, see infra note 21 and accompanying
text.
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tax as It IS in the United States,4 but is substantially integrated5 with
shareholder taxation by one method or another.
The suggestion that the United States should look to other countries
for models of law or economic policy may seem unusual. More typically,
in recent years influence has flowed in the opposite direction, as
transitional and emerging market countries have been presented with the
experience of the United States (and other mature tax systems) and the
advice and demands of the international monetary funds. 6 But it is
precisely because these countries are in the process of building tax systems
and need to focus on the most fundamental questions of tax administration
that their choices in entity taxation are interesting and instructive. The
United Kingdom and Germany historically have been important reference
points in the development of U.S. tax law. 7 Along with Japan and France,
they now are among the most significant participants in the global
economy, within which the United States and its tax system function.
Hence, even a limited comparative law survey of mature and developing
tax systems can offer valuable insights for U.S. tax policy. It should give
us some pause to find that on the question of the taxation of privately held
entities, the systemic choices of all these countries converge on a model of
entity taxation very different than our own.
For the past 35 years, U.S. business taxation has been marked by an
expansion in the number and kinds of business forms classified and taxed
on a pass-through model. In particular, the proliferation of partnership
taxation (one of the methods of pass-through taxation used in the United
States) to more business forms has been the result of self-help strategies
by taxpayers rather than positive legislation. Yet, pass-through taxation has
not been easy to manage within the federal income tax. Public and private
tax shelter partnerships have been a persistent problem. Despite the

4. See discussion of the classical two tier corporate tax infra text accompanying notes
12-13.
5. See discussion of integrated taxation infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g. , WARD M. HUSSEY & DONALD C. LUBICK, BASIC WORLD TAX CODE AND
COMMENTARY 1-30 (1996); John Turro, Emerging Economies: A Supply-Side Prescription
for Russia, 5 TAX NOTES INT'L 326 (August 17, 1992) (Heritage Foundation conference
on Russia's economic transition); John Iekel, Hungary Must Cut Taxes, Says World Bank
Study, II TAX NOTES INT'L 1221 (Nov. 6, 1995); John Iekel, U.S. IRS Commissioner
Visits Hungarian Counterparts, Offers Advice, 12 TAX NOTES INT'L 1543 (May 13, 1996);
David Michael Henry, Japan, World Bank Launch New Training Program for Tax Officials
From Developing Countries, 12 TAX NOTES INT'L 1696 (May 27,1996); FBIS, Argentine
Government Reaffirms Commitment to Reform in Letter to IMF, 13 TAX NOTES INT'L
1199 (Oct. 7, 1996) (tax reform and austerity program linked to IMF funding).
7. Roy G. BLAKEY & GLADYS C. BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 26, 503 (1940).
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burgeoning of statutes and regulations intended to contain these excesses,
concerns about compliance, tax avoidance and audit management have not
abated. A staggering amount of complexity has followed pass-through
taxation into U.S. tax law, burdening taxpayers and tax administrators to
such an extent that it may impede compliance. Nevertheless, Congress has
yet to revisit the fundamental premises of pass-through taxation and has
permitted taxpayers to develop new business forms intended to extend its
application. The Treasury regulations issued in 1996 at once consolidate
and expand the reach of pass-through taxation.
The choices made in the tax systems of the countries surveyed here
remind us that pass-through taxation is not the only alternative to a two-tier
tax for privately held business entities. Integrated corporate tax systems
are seen to fill much of the role that the United States now gives to passthrough taxation. While it may be heresy to question the expansion of
pass-through taxation in view of the high regard in which it is held in
income tax theory and its traditional place in U.S. tax law, the findings
reported here suggest that an examination of the systemic value of its
implementation in the United States is needed. Indeed, as the U.S. shift
toward more universal utilization of pass-through tax models by privately
held enterprises accelerates, more concerns about the partnership tax
method of pass-through taxation are being raised. A reassessment of what
pass-through taxation adds to the fairness and efficiency of the income tax
is clearly overdue. The comparative law context poses both the question
of the value of pass-through taxation and offers a different, perhaps
simpler, and more balanced design as a possible answer.
This article is divided into three parts. The first section explores the
question of how Heavy Duty II, the enterprise described in the
symposium's Master Hypothetical, is likely to be taxed in the U.S. context.
The second section presents the results of a brief survey of tax
classification patterns in six of the countries represented in the symposium
and four of the major trading partners of the United States. The third
section offers some preliminary observations that can be drawn from this
comparative law context.
D. THE U.S. CONTEXT
The case of Heavy Duty II arises at an important juncture in the
evolution of U.S. business tax policy. Recent changes in tax law have
pushed the federal income tax quite far down the road to making passthrough taxation the standard method of taxing privately held enterprises
in all business forms. Business structure is no longer the primary factor
in determining how a given enterprise will be taxed. The controlling issue
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now is whether the equity ownership interests in the enterprise are publicly
traded. If Heavy Duty II becomes a publicly traded entity at any point, it
will be taxed as a corporation. If it remains privately held, Heavy Duty II
and its owners are likely to be able to elect the generally more favorable
pass-through method of taxation for the enterprise in whatever business
form it may take. 8
For purposes of the analysis of U.S. taxation that follows, it is
assumed that Heavy Duty II is a U.S. family owned and operated
manufacturer of farm and construction equipment with gross revenues of
$20 million per year and annual pre-tax earnings of $1 million, after
paying appropriate salaries to all family members. Three generations of
the family work in the business. 9

A. Publicly Traded Enterprises
With few exceptions, U.S. business entities that are publicly traded are
treated as corporations in the federal income tax. The business form of the
enterprise does not affect this tax classification. Business corporations,
partnerships and limited liability companies alike are subject to the

8. All unincorporated entities that have not made an election to be taxed as a
corporation are classified as partnerships in accordance with Treasury Regulation sections
301.7701-2 and -3(a), issued in 1996. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2, -3(a). See infra notes
53-54 and accompanying text for the history of these regulations. Internal Revenue Code
section 7704 (a) provides that partnerships that are publicly traded are to be treated as
corporations. (This 1987 provision grandfathers certain pre-existing partnerships and
carves out an exception for passive investment vehicles). 1.R.c. § 7704(a). Ordinary
business corporations organized in the U.S. are classified as corporate taxpayers unless they
elect Subchapter S treatment. Corporate taxpayers that have not made the S election are
sometimes referred to as C corporations, the reference being to the Internal Revenue Code
subchapter that generally governs their taxation. However, S corporations are also subject
to subchapter C to the extent it is not inconsistent with Subchapter S. 1.R.c. § 1371 (a)( 1).
A corporation with more than 75 shareholders may not make or maintain a Subchapter S
election. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(I)(A). It is assumed here that an entity whose equity interests
are traded on an established securities exchange or readily tradable on a secondary market
would have more than 75 equity owners. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2; 1.R.c. § 1361.
A more extensive discussion of the limitations on the Subchapter S election can be found
infra text accompanying notes 48-50, 55.
9. The discussion in this article of the taxation of Heavy Duty II and business entities
in general is confined to the domestic context of each of the countries examined. Thus in
describing the U.S. tax outcomes, it is assumed that Heavy Duty II is an enterprise
organized in the U.S. and owned by U.S. persons. Questions of international tax law are
beyond the scope of this article. In the U.S., the domestic tax context includes state and
local taxation and a variety of federal taxes. The discussion of U.S. tax law in this article
is limited to the federal income tax except as noted.
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corporate tax if they are publicly traded. There are a handful of important
exceptions to this general rule for some passive investment vehicles,
including mutual funds and real estate investment trusts, but none of them
will apply to a manufacturer such as Heavy Duty 11. 10 Public trading of
equity interests in Heavy Duty II at any time will result in its classification
as a corporate taxpayer. Public trading, for these purposes, means that
equity interests in the business are traded on an established securities
exchange or are readily tradable on a secondary market. I I
Corporate taxation in the United States follows the classical corporate
model. 12 It is a two-tier tax. One level of tax is imposed on profits as
they are earned at the enterprise level. When profits are distributed to
equity owners who are individuals, the amount distributed is generally
treated as ordinary income that is fully subject to tax in their hands. \3
Economically, this tax on dividends is in effect a second tax on the
earnings of the enterprise. But in the classical corporate tax model, the
enterprise and its owners are regarded as separate taxpayers and hence each
is seen as realizing income with respect to these earnings. The entity has
income from its profits and the equity owner also realizes income from the
distribution that she receives.

10. Specifically, these vehicles are the REITs (I.R.e. § 851), RICs (1.R.e. § 856) and
REMICs (I.R.C. § 860 (A)-(G». In general, their corporate level tax is eliminated to the
extent they distribute profits to tl1eir investors. Although a narrow class of entities, they
are significant participants in the capital markets. See BORIS I. BITIKER & JAMES S.
EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS <JrlI 1.06,
1.08 [3] (6th ed. 1997). Analytically, the tax model applied to the RICs, REITs and
REMICs is a form of integrated corporate taxation. Other exceptions to normal corporate
taxation are made for cooperatives of different kinds under subchapter T of the Internal
Revenue Code. See I.R.C. § 1704(c) for the general exception for publicly traded
partnerships that are passive investment vehicles.
II. 1.R.e. § 7704. The idea that market liquidity of ownership interests is a principled
reason for the imposition of a separate entity level tax on enterprises is argued by Professor
Rebecca S. Rudnick in Who Should Pay the Corporate Tax in a Flat Tax World?, 39 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 965 (1989). From practical as well as theoretical perspectives others
have endorsed this view. See, e.g., Jerome Kurtz, The Limited Liability Company and the
Future of Business Taxation: A Comment on Professor Berger's Plan, 47 TAX L. REV.
815,823 (1992) and William A. Klein & Eric M. Zolt, Business Form, Limited Liability,
and Tax Regimes: Lurching Toward a Coherent Outcome? 66 COLO. L. REV. 1001, 1005
(1995). The 1996 regulations reach this result although without adopting Professor
Rudnick's thesis.

12. See BITIKER & EUSTICE, supra note 10,11 1.05 [I], 1.07 [2].
13. I.R.C. § 301; BITIKER & EUSTICE, supra note 10. Tax on intercorporate dividends
is reduced or eliminated depending on the percentage ownership in the shares of the
distributing corporation. See I.R.C. § 243 and the consolidated retllrn regulations.
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The financial impact of the double tax on owners and enterprise can
be seen in the following example. If Heavy Duty II were taxed as a
corporation and it had $1,000 in profits available to distribute to its
owners, it first would have to pay a tax of $350 on those profits, assuming
the highest marginal corporate tax rate (35%) applied. After the enterprise
level tax, $650 would remain available for distribution to the equity owners
as a dividend. When they received this $650 distribution, they would
include it in their individual incomes and an additional $257 AO in tax
would be due from them, assuming the highest individual marginal tax rate
(39.6%) applies. 14 After tax, the equity owners would get to keep $392.60
of the $1,000 profit earned. Thus, in this example, an amount equal to
61 % of the profits available for distribution to the owners is extracted by
the federal income tax.
Many other tax consequences flow from the concept that the enterprise
and its owners are separate taxpayers. Some of those consequences are
discussed below in the comparisons of corporate and pass-through
taxation. IS But the double tax on distributed profits is at once the central
feature of the U.S. corporate tax and its primary flaw in the eyes of many
economists, tax theorists, and business owners.16
B. Privately Held Enterprises
If Heavy Duty II remains a privately held business, its owners will
almost certainly choose for it to be taxed on a pass-through basis. New
Treasury regulations issued in 1996 classify all unincorporated business
entities as pass-throughs for tax purposes.1 7 Incorporated businesses that
qualify may elect pass-through tax treatment in accordance with Subchapter

14. For current tax rates, see 1.R.e. §§ I (individual), I I (corporate).
15. One issue not discussed below is the distinction between corporate and pass-through
taxation in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy does not alter the status of the corporation as a
taxpayer separate and apart from its owners, who remain insulated from tax liability at the
entity level. Similarly, owners of pass-through taxpayers continue to be responsible for the
income of the entity during bankruptcy as they are outside bankruptcy. See GORDON D.
HENDERSON AND STUART J. GOLDRING, FAILING AND FAILED BUSINESSES § 1003 (1996).
16. For a summary of the issues and authorities, see U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, REP. No.
4, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS, TAXING BUSINESS
INCOME ONCE 1-14 ( Jan. 6, 1992) [hereinafter TREASURY 1992]; AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND
CORPORATE INCOME TAXES, REPORTER'S STUDY OF CORPORATE T AX INTEGRATION, 21-46
(Mar. 31, 1993)(Alvin C. Warren, Jr., reporter) [hereinafter Warren, REPORTER'S STUDY].

17. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) and discussion supra note 8. The development of
these regulations and prior law are discussed infra notes 52-59.
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S.18
Thus, with very few constraints, pass-through taxation is applicable
in one form or another to all types of business entities. 19 As long as it is
not publicly traded, Heavy Duty II should be able to claim pass-through
tax status whether it incorporates, is organized as a partnership, or makes
use of the new limited liability company business form. 20
Pass-through taxation is a fundamentally different conceptual model
than the classical corporate tax regime and it can lead to dramatically
different financial results for both enterprise and owners. In pass-through
taxation, the entity is not regarded as a separate taxpayer. 21 The income,
gain and loss of the enterprise are taxed directly to the persons who own
the entity. Most simply put, pass-through taxation is a one level tax,
whereas corporate taxation is a two level tax.
One important distinction between the single tax and the corporate
double tax in terms of financial outcome can be seen by comparing the tax
treatment of distributed profits in both models. Assume Heavy Duty II
earns the same profit of $1,000 as in the corporate tax example above but
this time is taxed on a pass-through basis. If again the highest marginal
individual tax rates apply, these profits would bear a tax of $396 and it
would be paid directly by the owners of Heavy Duty II. No more tax is
due on these profits even after they are distributed to the owners.22 After

18. I.R.C. § 1361. See infra notes 30, 48-50, 55 and accompanying text, for a
discussion of the limitations.
19. The tax classification of trusts continues to be governed by Treasury Regulation
section 301.7701-4. The taxation of trusts is a large subject that is outside the scope of
this article.
20. The U.S. limited liability company (U.S. LLC) is described in Aleta G. Estreicher
& Warren S. Green, Heavy Duty ll:Forming A Business Entity in the United States, 17
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 307 (1997). See also Robert B. Thompson, The Taming
of the Limited Liability Company, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 921 (1995), for a history of its
development; LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES (1996), for a useful compilation of concepts and provisions
concerning LLCs in the 50 states.
21. Although the entity does not itself pay tax, in both partnership and Subchapter S
forms of pass-through taxation, the existence of the entity is not entirely disregarded.
Various tax elections must be made at the entity level and certain transactions between
owners and enterprise will be respected for tax purposes, including loans and employment
relationships. See STEPHEN UTZ, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF PARTNERS AND
PARTNERSHIPS §§ 4.01-.07, 7.19-.20 (A.L.1. 3d ed. 1995). See also JOHN K. MCNULTY,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF S CORPORATIONS 116.20-.21 (1992).
22. Allocation of income to the owner increases the owner's outside basis and losses,
distribution of cash or other property reduces that basis. Distributions result in income
only when they exceed outside basis. See I.R.C. §§ 1367, 1368 (concerning S corps),705,
731 (concerning partnerships).
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receiving the $1,000, a total of $604 would remain at the disposal of the
owners. In the corporate tax example above, only $392.60 was left after
federal income taxes were paid. The same $1,000 profit earned and
distributed by a pass-through taxpayer yields about one-third more after tax
funds than it did under the classical corporate tax regime. 23
The flow through of losses is an equally important feature of passthrough taxation. When the owners of a pass-through entity are actively
engaged in its trade or business as the Heavy Duty II owner/employees
would be, they generally are permitted to use the net losses of the
enterprise to offset their income from other sources. Passive investors are
restricted by numerous matching and timing rules in their use of losses. 24
The U.S. corporate income tax, which regards the corporate entity as a
separate taxpayer, treats the losses of the enterprise as an asset or attribute
of the entity and not of the equity holders. 25 The corporate taxpayer can
carry its losses forward or backward to reduce its own tax liability in other
years, but the losses of the business as a general matter have no direct
impact on the individual tax liability of the owners.26 Thus the owners of
Heavy Duty II will find that there are significant difference between passthrough taxation and corporate taxation in both profit and loss years.
C. Some Fine Points

1. Partnership Taxation or Subchapter S
Putting tax consequences to one side, the two business forms that the
owners of Heavy Duty II are most likely to consider for their enterprise are

23. However, it should be noted that in a pass-through system, the owner is liable for
tax on the earnings whether or not they are distributed. The owners of a corporate
taxpayer have tax liability for its earnings only when they are distributed. See infra note
40-47 and accompanying text, for a discussion of retained earnings.
24. In any given year, the flow through of losses to owners is limited by the tax basis
that the Owner has for his or her ownership interest in the entity. LR.C. §§ 704(d) (basis
limitation for pass-through of partnership losses), 1366(d) (Subchapter S loss limitations),
163(d) (limitation on deduction of investment interest), 465 (at risk limitations), 469
(passive activity loss limitations). See also McNULTY, supra note 21, <JrJ[ 6.10- 6.18; TZ,
supra note 21, § 6.01.
25. BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 10,1 1.07 [3]; see also Prudential Lines v. PSS
Steamship Co., 928 F.2d 565 (2nd Cir. 1991) cert.denied 502 U.S. 821 (1991).
26. However, NOLS can have an impact on earnings and profits thereby reducing
current taxable income from dividend distributions. See LR.C. §§ 301, 312; see also
BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 10, <JrJ[ 5.03[4], 8.02.
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the traditional business corporation and the new limited liability company.27
Although both types of entities can be tax pass-throughs, incorporated and
unincorporated entities ordinarily are taxed under two different sets of
rules. If Heavy Duty II is organized as a limited liability company, it will
be classified as a partnership and taxed in accordance with the Internal
Revenue Code's partnership tax rules. 28 If instead Heavy Duty II takes the
corporate business form, the Subchapter S pass-through tax regime will be
applicable to it, assuming that it is qualified. A corporation engaged in
manufacturing as Heavy Duty II is, would be eligible to elect Subchapter
S treatment as long as it has 75 or fewer shareholders, only one class of
stock, and its shares are not owned by any C corporations or nonresident
aliens. 29
The partnership and Subchapter S versions of pass-through taxation are
the same in concept but can be quite different in the details. Partnership tax
rules are both more liberal and more complex in their treatment of losses,
contributions, and distributions. In general, a partner can move assets in
and out of a partnership without incurring a current tax, while for an S
corporation, distribution of appreciated assets are taxable events and
contributions can also be taxable. 3D Also, within certain boundaries, the
Internal Revenue Code permits partnerships to make special allocations of
income and loss to achieve tax results that are at variance with the
economic or non-tax financial sharing between partners. It is possible, for
example, to allocate all of the depreciation deductions from a partnership's
real estate investment to one partner even when the partners share rental
income on a pro rata basis. J1

27. See generally Estreicher & Green, supra note 20.
28. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3. The regulations permit unincorporated entities to elect
to be treated as corporations, therefore, it is possible for a limited liability company to elect
to be a corporate taxpayer and then elect Subchapter S treatment. When the corporate
business form is used, the entity does not now have the option of electing partnership
taxation without liquidating and changing business form. But see supra note 33.
29. I.R.C. § 1361. Certain types of corporations not relevant to a discussion of Heavy
Duty II's options are ineligible as well. See infra notes 30, 32, 33.
30. For an overall discussion of the tax characteristics of an S corporation, see
MCNULTY, supra note 21, 'lI'lI 3.01-.02, 4.01,6.01-.24. For the differences between S
corporation taxation and partnership taxation, see id. 'lI'lI 10.01-.20. The greater liberality
of partnership taxation in the flow through of losses rests largely on the treatment of entity
level debt. For a discussion of the partnership basis adjustment provisions, see UTZ supra
note 21. §§ 5.01-.07.
31. Internal Revenue Code section 704(b) imposes the requirement that special
allocations have substantial economic effect but permits temporal shifting and item
allocation as in the depreciation example so long as the rules for Jceeping the partners'
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Heavy Duty II may find partnership taxation more attractive than S
corporation status because it would give it more freedom to tailor its
capital structure to accommodate the different income and estate planning
needs of the three generations of family members who are its current
equity owners. Subchapter S restricts the capital structure to a single class
of stock and may be less attractive to Heavy Duty II for this reason.32
Partnership taxation is not yet available to privately held corporations that
wish to retain that business form, although an election to permit such a
choice has been under discussion since 1995. 33
2. Earnings Stripping
If Heavy Duty II must use the corporate business form and cannot
hold itself to the pared-down capital structure of Subchapter S, it still may
be able to mitigate the impact of the corporate double tax. Two different
techniques are used in practice to reduce the tax on distributed profits to
a single level.
To the extent that a corporate taxpayer can distribute profits to its
owners as salary and reduce its taxable income by the amount of the salary
distribution, it can eliminate one level of tax on these earnings. This
practice is known as zeroing-out. 34 It is commonly used by owner-operated

capital accounts are followed and there is some risk that partners will have to make up
capital account deficits on liquidation. I.R.C. § 704(b). See, e.g., Treas.Reg. § 1.704l(b)(5) Ex.(2); UTZ, supra note 21, §§ 6.01-.09 (Professor Utz points out that the
requirement that special allocations have "substantial economic effect" by implication
permits allocations that do not have "full economic effect" and indeed only satisfy the
technical requirements of the regulations. Taxpayers typically see special allocations of
losses as a means of obtaining an early return on their investment). See also Larson v.
Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159, 163 (1976) (description of calculation of limited partners'
return on investment as including after tax value of losses).
32. Although Internal Revenue Code section 1361(b)(l)(D) restricts S corporations to
pro rata distributions to shareholders, a limited amount of disproportionate allocation and
variations in timing can be achieved through use of shareholder loans.
33. The possibility of extending partnership taxation to privately held corporations
eligible to make the subchapter S election was raised by Assistant Secretary of Treasury
Leslie Samuels in a letter to the House Ways and Means Committee in 1995 and has been
proposed a number of times since then. In its study of the entity classification issue, the
Joint Committee Staff report of April 8, 1997, suggested extending elective partnership
taxation to business corporations as one of the responses that Congress might make to the
1996 entity classification regulations (the so-called "Check-the-Box" Regulations). See
Joint Committee on Taxation, Review of Selected Entity Classification and Partnership Tax
Issues 3, 27 (JCS-6-97) (Apr. 8, 1997).
34. See, e.g., BIITKER & EUSTICE, supra nole 10, '1I 1.03.
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service businesses, such as lawyers or business consultants, which tend to
distribute all profits at the end of each year in any event. The technique
is also utilized by smaller family owned and operated enterprises.
However, it does not work well when the shareholders include investors
who do not perform services for the entity. When compensation is not
reasonable in relation to services rendered and industry standards; the
corporate tax deduction that eliminates the entity level tax is not assured?5
Industrial enterprises like Heavy Duty II that are capital intensive are
constrained by this standard as well; when profits exceed reasonable
salaries, it is not possible to treat the entire amount as compensation for
personal services. 36
However, if the corporation's capital structure includes debt, earnings
can be distributed as interest payments and hence removed from the
corporate level tax. Interest paid by the corporate taxpayer on 'its notes or
debentures is deductible by it. 37 Dividend payments are not. 38 If the
Heavy Duty II family shareholders and any passive investors structure their
investments in the new entity to include debt in the mix, they will have the
necessary mechanism for this technique. However, for the payments to be
treated as interest for tax purposes, the note holder generally must enforce
its terms, including payment obligations for interest and principal and
otherwise act in a commercially reasonable manner. 39
3. Retained Earnings
For an industrial enterprise like Heavy Duty II or a commercial
business, earnings stripping of either kind can be problematic. Going
concerns like these have capital plants and workforces that create ongoing

35. See Treas. Reg. § 162-7(a) (reasonableness standard for deduction for salaries paid).
36. Recent increases in social welfare payroll taxes in the U.S. that have added to the
tax burden on salaries may be making this technique less attractive. In particular, effective
January 1, 1994, the ceiling on Medicare contributions was removed and all earned income
is now subject to a payroll tax of2.9%. See I.R.C. §§ 3101(b), 3111(b), 3121(a); Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, § 13207(a)(1)(A)-(C), Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat.
312 (1993).
37. See I.R.C. §§ 163(a), (h)(l).
38. See BITIKER & EUSTICE, supra note 10, 'l! 4.01, for a discussion of the tax impact
of debt and equity for the corporate issuer. See also TREASURY 1992, supra note 16, at
5-11, for a discussion of the distortions in investment behavior seen to be caused by the
disparate treatment of debt and equity in corporate taxation.
39. See I.R.C. §§ 385, 163(i), (e)(5) (regarding limits on the use of high yield discount
notes). See also BITIKER & EUSTICE, supra note 10, TI 4.01, 4.26.
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needs for working capital and capital reinvestment. Retained earnings are
an important source of this capital and for this reason it is unlikely that all
of the net profits of Heavy Duty II would be available for distribution each
year in any event. However, for a corporate taxpayer in the current federal
income tax rate environment, deferring distributions of earnings can
mitigate the impact of the double tax. 40 But while retaining earnings to
finance growth can have a beneficial impact on a corporate taxpayer, for
a pass-through, retained earnings can be a problem.
In corporate taxation, as long as the profits are not distributed, the
second or shareholder level of tax is deferred and only the entity level tax
is imposed. 41 Moreover, by retaining earnings instead of distributing them,
the corporate taxpayer can transform dividends into capital gains which
typically are taxed more lightly than ordinary income in the United
States.42 Moreover, in some circumstances the capital gains tax on the
appreciation in value arising from reinvestment within the entity can be
further reduced or even eliminated. If, for example, the family patriarch
holds an equity interest in Heavy Duty II that has appreciated in value at

40. The bias in favor of retained earnings is one of the flaws that economists
traditionalIy have pointed to in the classical corporate two-tier tax. See discussion in
TREASURY 1992, supra note 16. But Professor Warren has demonstrated that this bias is
present only when corporate and capital gains rates are lower than individual rates.
Warren, REPORTER'S STUDY, supra note 16, at 28-40. The corollary of this conclusion is
that when corporate rates are higher than individual rates, there is an incentive to distribute
earnings so that reinvestment wilI be taxed at a lower rate. Thus Heavy Duty II family
members in lower tax brackets may prefer current distributions.
41. Publicly traded companies in the U.S. generally payout only a small fraction of
their earnings as dividends and hence, are not as adverse to the classical corporate tax as
one might expect. Part of the explanation for this reaction may be that managers prefer
other types of tax preferences that reduce their effective corporate tax rates. See, e.g.,
Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105 YALE
L.J. 325, 328 (1995). The corporate taxpayer that is most burdened by the double tax is
the one that must distribute earnings in the form of dividends. For a privately held
corporation, there is also the risk that earnings that are retained merely to defer tax and not
for reinvestment in the business, may become subject to penalty taxes. See 1.R.e. § 531.
If earnings are retained and invested in passive assets like real estate, passive income can
make the family owned corporation subject to the undistributed personal holding company
income tax. I.R.C. § 541.
42. The Internal Revenue Code favors retained earnings of corporate taxpayers in other
ways as well. For example, Internal Revenue Code section 1202 gives the shareholders
of qualifying privately held C corporations a partial exemption from the already more
favorable capital gains tax rates and the Heavy Duty II family may be able to take
advantage of this provision. 1.R.e. § 1202. Both C corporations and S corporations can
make use of the corporate reorganization provision to defer gain recognition on disposition
and hence defer tax on retained earnings even after disposition. I.R.C. § 368.
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the time of his death, the capital gain for his heirs will be eliminated by
operation of law when the basis for his equity interest is reset at fair
market value as of the date of his death. 43
In both forms of pass-through taxation, the equity owners are directly
taxed on retained earnings. For tax purposes, the income is theirs in the
year earned even when distributions of profits are deferred. 44 The direct
taxation of undistributed profits can be troublesome for two reasons.
Typically in the United States, the highest corporate tax rate is lower than
the higher range of individual tax rates. The individual owners pay tax on
retained earnings of the pass-through at their higher individual tax rates.
Currently, while the top individual rate is 39.6%, the corporate tax rate on
the first $10,000,000 of ordinary taxable income is only 34%.45 At this
level of income, the corporate taxpayer owes fifteen percent less than the
individual does.
In addition to the unfavorable rate differential at the high end of the
tables, the direct taxation of retained earnings in pass-through taxation
presents another kind of problem. Having no direct obligation to the
government to pay the tax on retained earnings, the pass-through entity will
only become involved in funding this liability to the extent that its owners
agree that its resources should be used for that purpose. The larger and
more diverse the ownership and the more centralized the management, the
more of a problem this decision can become. Even in a family group like
that of Heavy Duty II, an identity of investment goals and tax profiles may
not be found. The older generation may prefer to take nothing out of the
business while younger family members prefer to see the enterprise fund
their tax liabilities fully even if it must borrow to do so, or vice versa. The
corporate tax structure creates an identity of tax liability with respect to
retained earnings but it is an expensive solution because of the potential
double tax on distributions. 46 On the other hand, pass-through taxation can
43. 1.R.c. § 1014.
44. However, retained earnings do not result in a subsequent capital gains tax for the
owners of the passe through as they do for the shareholders of a corporate taxpayers. The
owner's basis for his equity interests is increased by the amount of current profit includable
in his income and through this mechanism, a second (capital gains) tax on the retained
earnings of the pass-through entity is eliminated. I.R.C. §§ 705, 1367.
45. Compare 1.R.c. § I, with I.R.C. § 11. See supra note 14.
46. Owners with different tax postures will have different views on the decision to
retain earnings for reinvestment within the corporate taxpayer or to distribute profits, with
lower bracket owners probably preferring more distributions which they can reinvest at
their lower rates. But once the decision to reinvest rather than distribute has been made,
only the corporate taxpayer has any liablity for the tax on the retained earnings. See
Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, Taxes, Agency Costs, and the Price of Incorporation, 77
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result in a continuing need to reinvest in the business by using other
financial resources to fund the tax on the profits of the enterprise if
sufficient cash is not distributed.
Corporate tax is not always more burdensome than pass-through
taxation as the discussion of earnings stripping and retained earnings
demonstrates. But it is substantially more costly when earnings are to be
distributed as dividends or the effective capital gains rate is substantia1.47
On balance, Heavy Duty II and its owners will consider themselves
fortunate to have been able to choose pass-through taxation for their
business and avoid the corporate double tax.

D. U.S. Business Tax Policy
Prior to 1996, Heavy Duty II would have been much more constrained
in its ability to make use of pass-through taxation. That year marked a
watershed in the development of U.S. income tax policy toward business.
The combined effects of the actions taken by Congress and Treasury in
1996 contributed very substantially to the establishment of pass-through
taxation as the norm for privately held enterprises in all business forms in
the United States. The opportunity that businesses like Heavy Duty II now
have to avoid the two-tier corporate tax without giving up the features of
business form and operating structure that they prefer is in large measure
the result of the consolidation and expansion of pass-through taxation that
occurred during 1996.
In the Tax Reform Act of 1996, Congress significantly reduced the
operating restrictions and some of the ownership limitations on the use of
Subchapter S, making the election for privately held business corporations
more attractive and more widely available than ever before. The number
of shareholders permitted was increased from 35 to 75.48 For the first

VA. L. REV. 211, 234-38 (1991), for a discussion of the impact of different tax models on
disposition and distribution decisions where stakeholders in an enterprise have different tax
positions.
47. Again the confluence of tax rates is critical to this conclusion but in the U.S. the
corporate rates generally have been lower than the individual tax rates and capital gains
have been taxed at even lower rates. Warren, REPORTER'S STUDY, supra note 16, at 30 &
39. The deferral of tax payments inherent in the realization requirement for capital gains
taxation reduces the cost of the capital gains tax with the result that later realization means
a lower effective tax rate and earlier realization results in a higher effective rate.
48. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, § 1301, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat.
1755 (1996). The 1996 amendments to Internal Revenue Code section 1361 are
summarized in Joel H. Sharp, Jr. & Hewitt B. Shaw, Jr., Subchapter S Refonn: The Small
Business Job Protection Act of 1996,241. CORP. TAX'N 3 (1997).
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time, S corporations were permitted to have wholly-owned corporate
subsidiaries and to be owned by other Subchapter S corporations. 49
Restrictions on the issuance of debt to financial institutions were lifted and
intergenerational transfers of ownership were made easier. 50
The new Treasury regulations issued in 1996 played an even greater
role in moving U.S. business taxation toward the pass-through model. 51
These regulations have changed both the method and substance of tax
classification for privately held U.S. business entities. The changes that
these regulations effected give the pass-through model a more central role
in the structure of business taxation than had been possible in the past.
Although presented as an election, the new regulations classify all privately
held business entities that do not use the nomenclature of incorporation
(and have more than one equity holder) as partnerships for tax purposes.
Unincorporated entities with a sole owner are treated as completely
transparent for tax purposes. 52 The old classification regulations required
that the business structure of each unincorporated entity be analyzed to
determine whether it should be taxed as a corporation or as a partnership.
When more corporate characteristics than partnership features were found,

49. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(3).
50. I.R.c. § 1361(c)(5) (institutional debt). See the discussion of intergenerational
transfer issues in Sharp & Shaw, supra note 48, at 21-24.
51. Treasury Regulation section 301.7701-1 to -5 were published in final form in the
Federal Register on December 18, 1996. 61 Fed. Reg. 66, 584-93 (1996). The Treasury
Department announced that it was considering this new policy for entity classification on
April 3, 1995. I.R.S. Notice 95-14,1995-2 C.B. 297. Proposed regulations came out on
May 13, 1996. 61 Fed. Reg. 21, 989 (1996).
52. Treas. Reg. §301.7701-3(a). The popular name "Check-the-Box regulations"
derived from the Treasury proposal to make tax classification of unincorporated privately
held entities an actual election for taxpayers rather than a choice implemented by drafting
organizational documents to include or exclude the test attributes. I.R.S. Notice 95-14,
supra note 51. The regulations do not in fact require an election but instead by means of
the default rule, classify all U.S. unincorporated entities with two or more owners as
partnerships for tax purposes and at the same time permit them to elect corporate taxation
if they choose. Sole owner unincorporated entities are treated as a "nothing" for tax
purposes unless the owner elects corporate tax treatment. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a).
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the entity was classified as a corporate taxpayer. 53 This result was thought
to have been required by the Internal Revenue Code. 54
Businesses typically want to have some if not all of the structural
features of the corporate business form-limited liability, continuity of
entity life, free transferability of interests and centralized management-but
do not want to be subject to the corporate double tax. 55 The old
regulations compelled taxpayers to compromise some of the corporate
business form features that they wanted in order to obtain pass-through tax
classification. But over the past twenty-five years, sophisticated taxpayers
became increasingly adept and aggressive in crafting business structures
that expanded partnership classification to entities that were functionally

53. The old entity classification regulations tested for four corporate characteristics:
limited liability, continuity of life of the entity, free transferability of ownership interests,
and centralized management. The regulations were weighted toward partnership
classification because when they were issued in 1960, the IRS was trying to prevent
doctors and lawyers from obtaining corporate tax status for the entities through which they
conducted their professional practices. At that time, employees of corporations could
participate in very generous tax-deferred pension plans while partners could not. Called
the Kintner Plan regUlations, they were issued on November 15, 1960 in the midst of this
controversy. T.D.6503, 1960-2 e.B. 409. See WILLIAM S. McKEE, et aI., FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS, <J[ 3.06 (2d abr. stud. ed. Supp.
1993).
54. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935); Larson, 66 T.e. 159.
An earlier case, Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass'n v. Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110 (1925), rejected the
use of the nomenclature of business forms in state law as the basis for tax classification.
55. The Subchapter S election has existed since 1958 but prior to the 1982 Subchapter
S reforms, much more limiting operating and eligibility criteria applied. Only JO
shareholders were permitted, it was risky to issue debt, the pass-through rules were
complex and there were line of business restrictions as well. See BITTKER & EUSTICE,
supra note JO,<J[ 6.01; SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, REPORT ON H.R. 6055 (September 29,
1982), excerpted in Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, Law and Explanation <J[ 315 (CCH
1982). Even with the 1996 expansion of Subchapter S, there is a 75 shareholder limit.
Tax law imposes no limit on the number of owners an entity classified as a partnership
may have. Apparently it is not uncommon for entities classified as partnerships to have
more than 250 members. Treasury has recently been working on legislation to allow it to
better manage the audits of such large partnerships. Moreover, although since the 1996
amendments Subchapter S corporations may own C corporations, they still may not have
C corporations as shareholders. Corporations of any kind may be members of partnerships
as far as the Internal Revenue Code is concerned. See also the discussion of the
differences between Subchapter S and partnership taxation SUprtl notes 30-33 and
accompanying text.
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similar to corporations. 56 The limited liability company was designed to
manipulate the classification regulations in just that fashion. 57
Despite its general success, the process of drafting business structures
around the restrictions in the old regulations was costly and uncertain. 58
Moreover, some compromises in the design of business structures were still
necessary. The 1996 entity classification regulations have resolved all of
these tensions in favor of taxpayer choice on all issues. With very little
qualification, the new regulations make pass~through taxation the standard
method of taxing privately held enterprises. All partnerships, limited
partnerships, limited liability companies, joint ventures, limited liability
partnerships and co~partnerships are now classified as pass~through
taxpayers without regard to the particular features of their individual
business structures.
Indeed, if taxpayers and state legislatures were to create a new
business form that exactly replicated the traditional corporate form but did
not use the words "incorporate" or "corporation," under the new
regulations these entities would be classified as partnerships.59 The idea

56. N.Y. S. B.A. Tax Sec., Report on the "Check-the-Box" Entity Classification System
Proposed in Notice 95-14, 95 TAX NOTES TODAY 173-64 (Sept. 5, 1995) [hereinafter NYS
Bar Report 1995]. The holding in the Larson case that presence or absence of limited
liability was no more weighty a factor than any of the other three, closely preceded the
enactment of the first limited liability company statute in Wyoming. Larson, 66 T.C. at
180.
57. The new U.S. LLC business form in large measure was the precipitating factor in
the abandonment of traditional entity classification jurisprudence. The Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) and Treasury took cognizance of the LLC in their 1995 proposal to
transform entity classification policy, citing the IRS's own 1988 ruling on LLC
classification as evidence of the ease with which LLCs and other entities it described as
being "designed to provide limited liability protection to all members and to otherwise
resemble corporations" were able to qualify for partnership classification. Notice 95-14,
supra note 51, para. 4. In what can be described as a biofeedback loop, the U.S. LLC
which was specifically designed to exploit the biases of the old entity classification
regulations has undermined the entire system of entity classification in the eyes of many
and led to its demise.
58. Notice 95-14 adverts to the time and resources that taxpayers and IRS expended in
classifying entities under the old regulations. Mention is also made of the possible
disadvantage that the old regulations imposed upon small unincorporated organizations that
lacked "sufficient resources and expertise to apply the current classification regulations to
achieve the tax classification they desire." Notice 95-14, 1995-2 C.B. 297. The extent of
uncertainty, and hence the hurdle that the old regulations posed for selecting tax
classification can be gauged to some extent by the list of unresolved issues included in the
NYS Bar 1995 Report. NYS Bar Report 1995, supra note 56, at 20-21.
59. The report of the New York State Bar Association Tax Section, submitted to the
Treasury on August 23, 1996, noted that the determination of whether an entity was
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that state legislatures might reinvent the business corporation under another
name to give constituents a tax advantage is not without precedent. Within
less than ten years of the first ruling from the Internal Revenue Service
confirming that the limited liability company had the potential to be a passthrough taxpayer, all 50 states had adopted limited liability company
statutes. 60 But even without a new corporate clone business form, it seems
likely that partnership taxation will increasingly dominate the taxation of
privately held entities as the U.S. limited liability company develops and
its use spreads. 6J
The authority of the Treasury to change entity classification law in this
manner has been questioned by the staff of the Congressional Joint
Committee on Taxation. 62 Self-described as a "Simplification of Entity
Classification Rules," these regulations clearly have a significant
incorporated now will depend entirely upon the language used in the statute authorizing
it, seeming to leave to state legislatures the choice of which domestic entities will be
classified as corporations in all events. N.Y. S. B.A. Tax Sec., Report on the Proposed
"Check-the-Box" Regulation, 96 TAX NOTES TODAY 169-22 (Aug. 23,1996) [hereinafter
NYS Bar Report 1996]. The regulations state that the term corporation means a business
entity organized under a statute (federal or state) that "describes or refers to the entity as
incorporated or as a corporation, body corporate or joint stock company." Insurance
companies and certain banks and state owned bodies are also denied the privilege of
elective classification. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b). A switch to English corporate law
nomenclature, which might be readily made, apparently would change the tax classification
result. English corporations are caJled "limited companies." See infra note III.
60. See RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 20, § 1.06.
61. The U.S. LLC was rapidly gaining a wide following even before the "Check-theBox" regulations were proposed. The Internal Revenue Service reports that for the 1994
tax year, there was an increase of 176% in the number of LLCs filing tax returns as
compared to 1993. Only 17,335 LLC returns were reported for 1993, while 47,816 were
filed in 1994. In the same year, there was an increase of 272.6% in the number of
taxpayers reported as members of LLCs. SOl reports 84,000 members of LLCs in 1993
and 313,000 for 1994. Timothy D.Wheeler, Partnership Returns, /994, I.R.S. STAT. OF
INCOME BULL.76, 77, Fig. E. (1996). Since Treasury made its "Check- the-Box" proposal
in January 1995, the use of LLCs has grown even more rapidly. New York did not have
an LLC statute until October 24, 1994, but 17,623 new LLCs were registered in the first
26 months after enactment. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, one of the last states
to adopt an LLC statute, registered 2,587 LLCs in the first 13 months after its January 1,
1996 effective date. (The information on LLC registration was obtained in telephone calls
to the Offices of the Secretary of State of New York and of Massachusetts on February 17,
1997.)
62. Letter to practitioners from Joint Committee on Taxation Chief of Staff, Kenneth
1. Kies. Kies Invites Experts to Discuss "Check-the-Box" Regs., 96 TAX NOTES TODAY
223-27 (Nov. IS, 1996); Joint Committee on Taxation Staff, supra note 33. See also
Philip F. Postlewaite and John S. Pennell, JCT's Partnership Tax Proposals: "Houston, We
Have a Problem," 97 TAX NOTES TODAY 144-66 (July 28, 1997).
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substantive impact as well as a methodological one. 63 Congress has yet to
respond to the new regulations and did not move to counter them during
the almost two years of public discussion of the proposal. Moreover, in
view of the long history of Congressional acquiescence to the expansion
of partnership taxation to new business forms, it is not very likely that
Congress would reverse the trend at this point. The only alternative to
pass-through taxation in current U.S. tax law is the two-tier corporate tax.
It seems unlikely that Congress would want to be seen to be pushing
privately held businesses back toward what they regard as an unpopular,
burdensome, and economically irrational system.
Nonetheless, in the U.S. experience, partnership taxation at best has
had only mixed results as a method of taxation. Despite endless discussion
and voluminous regulations, it is complex to apply and troublesome to
administer. In the era of public tax shelters in the 1970' sand 1980' s,
abuses of partnership taxation became so notorious that they threatened the
integrity of the income ta)(.64 Some of the more obvious problems have
been addressed but at a cost of considerable systemic complexity. A whole
host of provisions limiting the use of losses flowing through to passive
investors were added to tbe Internal Revenue Code to try to contain the
public tax shelter abuses. 65 Currently, there is wide spread concern about

63. Treas. Reg. § 301-7701-1. The check the box idea was widely discussed as a
simplification of the method of entity classification because it eliminated the requirement
of analyzing the characteristics of each unincorporated entity to test for corporate
resemblance under the old four factor test. See, e.g., Susan Pace Hamill, The Taxation of
Domestic Limited Liability Companies and Limited Partnerships: A Case for Eliminating
the Partnership Classification Regulations, 73 WASH. U.L.Q. 565, 598-601 (1995). But the
proposal was also understood to represent a more fundamental change. See Kurtz, supra
note II.
64. Joint Committee on Taxation, General Explanation of the Tax Refonn A ct of 1986,
at 209-14 (JCS-IO-87) (May 4, 1987) [hereinafter 1986 JCT Blue Book].
65. See id. at 215-22 (passive activity limitations), 255-57 (extension of at-risk rules
to real estate), 262-70 (investment interest limitation), 1290-94 (tax shelter registration,
penalties and interest), describing provisions added by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and
at-risk limitations added in 1976, 1978 and 1984. The present regulations governing
special allocations of income and loss, which were another response to the era of public
tax shelters, are absurdly complicated and difficult for taxpayers and the IRS to apply when
faced with the endless variety of partnership interests that can be designed and negotiated.
The ALI partnership treatise calls the Internal Revenue Code section 704(b) regulations
"monstrously complex." UTZ, supra note 21, at 107-152 for overall description of the
regulations. There are also inconsistencies with other provisions concerning special
al\ocations. One instance of both inconsistency and continuing uncertainty is the
application of these regulations to partnerships between tax exempt and non-tax exempt
persons. Compare 1.R.c. § 514(c)(9)(E), with Treas. Reg. § 704 -I.
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the use of private tax shelters by corporations and very wealthy individuals
to disguise sales of assets in which tens of millions of dollars in tax can
be at stake in a given transaction. 66 These abuses apparently still flourish
despite the adoption of an anti-abuse regulation in 1994, aimed at
preventing the use of partnership tax rules to reach tax results so much at
odds with economic results. 67
Some of the traditional outcomes of partnership taxation in the United
States are also being criticized in the current round of partnership tax
reform proposals. For example, both Treasury and academic tax policy
theorists have suggested restricting the special allocation rules that permit
partners to transfer tax losses among themselves as they choose. Nor is it
clear what tax policy goals are served by this time honored practice, which
largely survived the recently adopted anti-abuse regulations. 68 The

66. See, e.g., Allan Sloan, Sloan Looks at New Chandler Family Partnership with Times
Mirror, 97 TAX NOTES TODAY 165-16 (Aug. 26, 1997) (press watch report of Washington
Post story of swap of $475 million of Times Mirror stock for $249 million in cash and
$226 million in real estate through a partnership resulting in the elimination or deferral of
an estimated $75 million in tax). The discussion of the proposed partnership anti-abuse
regulation, now Treasury Regulation section 1.701-2, focused on this problem to some
extent. N.Y. S. B.A. Tax Sec., Report on Proposed A nti-A buse Regulation, 94 TAX NOTES
TODAY 130-34 (July 6,1994). See Utz, supra note 21, at 164-72, 177-83, for a description
of the range of planning choices for asset basis adjustment that can be used to defer gain
when assets are exchanged through partnerships. The debate between Mark P. Gergen and
John P. Steines, Jr. at the 1991 NYU Colloquium on Partnership Taxation over the need
for changes in the regUlations that govern some of the more basic issues in the taxation of
partnership asset contribution and distribution indicates some of the problems of applying
the already complex statutory rules and interpretive regulations. Mark P. Gergen,
ReJomzing Subchapter K: Contributions and Distributions, 47 TAX L. REV. 173; John P.
Steines, Jr., Unneeded ReJomz, 47 TAX L. REV. 239 (1991). See also the discussion of
the "hot asset" or "mixing bowl" problem in William D. Andrews, Inside Basis Allocations
and Hot Asset Exchanges in Partnership Distributions, 47 TAX L. REV. 3 (1991); Noel B.
Cunningham, Needed ReJomz: Tending the Sick Rose, 47 TAX L. REV. 77 (1991). More
recently, Joint Committee Staff included proposals to alter the statutory scheme that allows
the mixing bowl result. Joint Committee on Taxation, supra note 33.
67. In the course of the debate over the adoption of the anti-abuse regulations, a number
of partnership tax experts, including the principal author of the special allocation
regulations, maintained on the basis on the legislati ve history of subchapter K of the I.R.C.,
that U.S. partnership tax rules historically were not intended to keep tax results consistent
with economic results. Lee A. Shepard, Partnership A nti-A buse Rule-Dirty Minds Meet
Mrs. Gregory, 94 TAX NOTES TODAY 141-5 (July 21, 1994). This is anomalous with the
view of tax theory that pass-through taxation most accurately reflects economic income and
illustrates how important the actual implementation of any model of taxation is in assessing
its systemic value.
68. Professor Berger raises fundamental questions about the benefits of special
allocations and current rules enhancing loss flow through, suggesting that partnership
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problems of compliance and administration of partnership taxation seem to
be becoming more burdensome as the size of entities taxed as partnerships
increases again. Congress is now considering proposals to redesign and
simplify the pass-through of income to partners in entities with more than
100 members. New audit rules for large partnership are also proposed to
give the Internal Revenue Service more control in managing the collection
problems inherent in pass-through taxation: all of the partners must be
pursued to collect the tax on the profits of an enterprise that is taxed on a
pass-through basis. 69
The staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation in Congress recently
expressed the concern that partnership tax law has not kept pace with the
increasing sophistication of taxpayers and is not equal to the task of
dealing appropriately with the growing numbers of entities expected to
choose partnership taxation in the wake of the new entity classification
regulations. 70 These fears seem to be well founded. Although the model
of pass-through taxation in theory should result in a more accurate measure
of income, in practice in the United States, it seems to be very distant
from this ideal. It is difficult to view the beginning of this new era of
business taxation-in which pass-through taxation is to have such a central
role-without concern.
ID. THE

COMPARATIVE LAW CONTEXT

The new norms in the taxation of privately held businesses in the
federal income tax represent a significant structural shift toward passthrough taxation in general and partnership taxation in particular in the
United States. The symposium presented an unusual opportunity to think
about these developments in United States business tax policy in a
comparative law context.

taxation conform more to S corporation rules on these points. Curtis J. Berger, W(h)ither
Partnership Taxation? 47 TAX L. REV. 105 (1991). See also Utz, supra note 21, at 118 19. But see Rebecca S. Rudnick, Enforcing the Fundamental Premises of Partnership
Taxation, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 229 (1993). Treasury raised the issue of the section 704(b)
special allocation regulations in early 1996. Lee A. Sheppard, NY SBA Tax Section Gets
Dose of Politics and Partnerships, 96 TAX NOTES TODAY 16-5 (Jan. 24,1996) but this point
did not appear in the Joint Committee Staff list of partnership tax reform proposals in its
April 1997 report. Joint Comrnittee on Taxation, supra note 33.
69. These proposals were enacted in July 1997 as part of Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997,
P.L. 105-34, § 1061, 1062(b)(3), 1063 & 1221(a). There are now different rules for large
partnerships as well as small partnerships. I.R.C. § 6231. Distinctions are also made
based upon line of business and owner involvement in the activity of the entity.
70. Kies Letter, supra note 62; Joint Committee on Taxation, supra note 33.
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The symposium's corporate law panel discussions included a
consideration of the future of Heavy Duty II as a privately held enterprise
as well as its prospects as a publicly traded entity. For all of the panel
countries with domestic public capital markets,71 it was noted that a
publicly traded Heavy Duty II would be classified as a corporation for
income tax purposes. For all four of these countries it was also reported
that Heavy Duty II would be a corporate taxpayer in a system that
followed an integrated corporate tax model of some kind with respect to
dividends instead of imposing the full double tax on distributions seen in
the classical two-tier corporate tax model used in the United States. The
prevalence of integrated taxation among the panel countries was not
surprising. The continued adherence of the United States to the classical
corporate tax in the face of the movement toward integration in the
taxation of corporations in many other tax systems has been the subject of
much discussion and criticism in this country.72
However, the reports of the panelists on the taxation of Heavy Duty
II as a privately held business were unexpected. Panelists indicated that
even as a privately held limited liability company, in their countries, Heavy
Duty II would be treated as a corporation for income tax purposes. 73 This
was particularly surprising because the conventional view that the new U.S.
71. The pant!! presentation on the Peoples Republic of China focused primarily on
structures for in-bound foreign investment. Detailed information concerning business forms
and taxation entirely within the domestic sphere (which operates under a different set of
laws than those applicable to foreign investors) in China was not available to the author.
For this reason it has not been possible to include the PRC domestic tax system in this
discussion.
72. Its last major initiative on corporate integration led Congress to commission the
study by Treasury which was completed in 1992. TREASURY 1992, supra note 16.
Germany, France, and the United Kingdom adopted integrated corporate taxation between
1953 and 1977. Australia and New Zealand did so in 1987 and 1988. Deborah W.
Thomas & Keith F. Sellers, Eliminate the Double Tax on Dividends, 11-94 J. ACCT. 86
(1994). Japan adopted a very complete form of corporate integration in 1950 following
the recommendation of U.S. tax theorist, Carl Shoup. In a 1987 tax reform, Japan moved
much closer to a two-tier tax. HUGH AULT, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 72, 353 (1997). The view that integration is the better model of
taxation for corporations is widely but not universally held among economists and tax
academicians in the U.S. Compare Alvin Warren, Jr., The Relation and Integration of
Individual and Corporate Income Taxes, 94 HARV. L. REV. 717 (1981), with Jeffrey L.
Kwall, The Uncertain Case for Corporate Tax Integration, 68 N.C. L. REV. 613 (1990).
The costs of transition and overall welfare gains from integration continue to be debated
as different models are proposed. See, e.g., Reed Shuldiner, Commentary Coporate
Integration: Do the Uncertainties Outweigh the Benefits?, 47 TAX L. REV. 653 (1992).
73. Argentina adopted a tax reform measure that changed its tax law on this point a few
months after the symposium. See infra notes 101-102 and accompanying text.
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limited liability company was to some degree modeled on the limitada
might be thought to imply that such entities are also pass-through taxpayers
within their own systems. 74 This turned out not to be the case. Moreover,
pass-through taxation did not seem to be a possibility for a privately held
industrial or commercial enterprise like Heavy Duty II in any of the
business forms that were suitable for it. 75 From the perspective of U.S.
taxation, these comments raised intriguing questions about structural
choices in business tax policy. The first issue was to try to determine what
role the pass-through model, now so strongly favored in the United States,
has in the taxation of privately held entities in the other countries.
Using the reports of both the bankruptcy and corporate law panels on
taxation of Heavy Duty I and II in their respecti ve countries as the starting
point and secondary research for further elucidation, a brief survey has
been compiled of tax classification of business entities in ten countries.
The core group in the survey was made up of the six panel countries:
Argentina, Hungary, Mexico, Romania, South Africa, and South Korea.
Four other countries with mature tax systems-Germany, France, Japan
and the United Kingdom-were added to the core group of developing and
transitional market countries to provide an additional reference point.
These four countries were chosen for two reasons. All four are fully
74. See. e.g., UTZ, supra note 21; Sanford 1. Liebschutz, Introduction to Limited
LiabiLity Companies and Limited LiabiLity Pannerships, in THE NEW LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANY AND LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIP LAW, N.Y. S. Bar Ass'n CLE program
(Oct. 1995). Professor Carney argues that the English joint stock company is the preexisting business form closest to the U.S. LLC. William J. Carney, Limited Liability
Companies: Origins and Antecedents, 66 COLO. L. REV. 855, 857 (1995). If he is correct,
the U.S. LLC may be a corporation within the meaning of Internal Revenue Code section
7704(a)(3). However, it is widely reported that the first U.S. LLC statute, adopted in
Wyoming, was proposed at the request of the Hamilton Brothers Oil Company and was
to some extent modeled on the Panamanian sociedad de responsabiLidad Limitada. a
business form with which they were familiar from prior use. See Dale A. Osterle,
Subcurrents in LLC Statutes: Limiting the Discretion of State Couns to Restrncture the
Internal Affairs of SmalL Business, 66 COLO. L. REV. 881, 882 (1995). At least currently,
the Limitada business form is taxed as a corporation in Panama. DELOITTE AND TOUCHE
LLP, TAXES IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA § 10.10, avaiLabLe in LEXIS, albeit within
an integrated corporate tax system, as it is throughout Latin and South America. See
Syllas Tozzini & Jose Luis de Sa\les Freire, Business Operations In BraziL, 954 Tax Mgmt.
(BNA) A-8 to -9 (I992); Nicasio Del Castillo et a!., Business Operations In VenezueLa.
993 Tax Mgmt. (BNA) A-52 (1995); DELOITTE AND TOUCHE LLP, supra, §§ 4.01 (Chile),
5.01 (Colombia), 6.01 (Costa Rica), 7.01 (Ecuador), 11.01 (Peru), 12.01 (Uruguay).
Argentina and Mexico are discussed infra notes 76, 90-92, 98-104 and accompanying text.
75. It was assumed that Heavy Duty II would require such features as limited liability
and centralized management in its business structure. See Estreicher & Green, supra note
20.
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industrialized, major trading partners of the United States and are
influential in both regional and global markets. Further, the French and
German commercial and civil codes historically have been important
sources of business law in Mexico, Argentina, Hungary, and Romania, and
through Japan, for South Korea as wele6 The United Kingdom has been
one of the major sources of law for South Africa77 as well as for the
United States.

A. The Survey
The survey looked at a number of issues in connection with entity
classification. 78 The central problem was to identify the models of income
taxation-classical corporate, pass-through, integrated corporate and
variations-that apply to privately held businesses in the various countries
and then to explore the structural patterns of taxation that result.

76. For a general discussion of civil law antecedents, see JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ET
AL., THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA, AND EAST ASIA 1187 (1994);
RUDOLPH B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 829-33 (5th ed. 1988). Regarding
Hungary, see PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN HUNGARY 80 (1993); accord
Kristin De Kuiper, The Limited Liability Company - A Comparison of the Czech, Slovak
and German Examples with the New American Entity, I PARKER SCI-t. J. E. EUR. L. 291,
291-94 (1994). Hebert reports that the French S.A.R.L. (Societe a Responsabilitee
Limitee) was introduced in 1925 and modeled on the German GmbH. SYLVIE HEBERT,
The French Limited Liability Company, in THE EUROPEAN PRIVATE COMPANY? 77 (HarmJan De Kluiver & Walter Van Gerven eds., 1995). During the Japanese occupation of the
Korean peninSUla from 1910 to 1945, the Japanese civil and commercial codes, which
followed the German codes, were imposed. Robert A. Baskerville & Woo Taik Kim,
Business Operations in the Republic of Korea, 970 Tax Mgmt. (BNA) A-I (1997).
Regarding Argentina, see generally Juan Dobson, Reflections On Heavy Duty Argentina
II, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 379 (1997).
77. South African law is typically described as having preserved its Roman-Dutch
character while being influenced by common law. SCHLESINGER, supra note 76, at 247,
317,320.
78. The focus of this survey is somewhat narrow: income tax classification of business
entities. To some extent this focus on income tax by itself, removes the question from the
broader economic and policy context that gives it the most meaning. All businesses in all
countries are subject to a broad array of taxes. Income tax is typically only one among
a host of taxes including the various turnover taxes, V AT and other consumption taxes,
asset and wealth taxes, payroll and social security taxes and ultimatelY, death taxes. The
presence or absence of a capital gains tax is a key feature of business taxation and must
be considered with the income tax to achieve a full understanding of the impact of a given
method of business taxation. Although important to a complete understanding of the
implications of any income tax problem, the impact of other taxes is beyond the scope of
chis inquiry.
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The classical corporate tax model and pass-through taxation have been
described and contrasted in the preceding discussion of the U.S. taxation
of Heavy Duty II. But it is necessary to understand how integrated
corporate taxation differs from both these models of business taxation to
evaluate the significance of the findings of the survey. In all ten of the
countries surveyed, the corporate tax regime is integrated at least to some
extent.
In its broadest definition, an integrated corporate tax is a system in
which one of the two levels of tax imposed on distributed corporate profits
in the classical corporate tax model is eliminated or moderated. Generally,
corporate and individual taxation are coordinated or integrated so that
either the entity or the individual equity owner, but not both, pay tax on
the profits that are distributed. 79 In some instances, a lesser degree of
integration is achieved by reducing one of the two tiers of tax rather than
eliminating it completely.
Although a number of approaches are discussed in the tax literature,80
two methods of integration are actually seen in practice: the shareholder
credit and the dividend exclusion. Among the countries in the survey,
Argentina, Hungary, Mexico, Romania, and South Africa, all use a
dividend exclusion approach or, with similar effect; provide reduced tax
rates on distributions from corporate taxpayers. In France, Germany,
Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom, a shareholder credit system
is used to integrate corporate and individual taxation. The impact of the
shareholder credit method is very different from that of the dividend
exclusion approach.
These two methods of integration have a common starting point. In
both, the entity pays a corporate income tax on its profits on a current
basis. 81 In the shareholder credit model, when profits are distributed to

79, See Warren, supra note 72, for an authoritative source on the theory and
methodology of integrated taxation. The view expressed in TREASURY 1992, that
integration should be broadly understood as taxing business income once represents a
somewhat different conceptual starting point than that generally seen in the economic and
tax policy literature that urges the taxing of capital to its (individual) owners. TREASURY
1992, supra note 16, at 1. See, e.g., Deborah H. Schenk, Complete Integration in a Partial
Integration World, 47 TAX L. REV. 697, 698-700 (1992).
80. Professor Warren notes seven different methods, including at least two in the first
numbered item in his list. Warren, REPORTER'S STUDY, supra note 16, at 47-48;
TREASURY 1992, supra note 16, introduction at x, develops two additional models, CBIT
and the modified shareholder allocation method.
81. If tax has not been paid at the entity level, a compensatory tax is typically imposed
before the shareholder credit is given or the dividend is excluded. But this is not always
the case. In Canada, the integrated tax for privately held companies that are Canadian
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equity owners, the tax burden on these profits shifts to the owners and the
entity level tax previously paid becomes in effect a withholding tax on the
distribution. 82 The equity owner will owe additional tax on the dividend
if her individual tax rate is higher than the rate at which the entity paid tax
and will likely get a refund if her personal rate is lower. 83
In contrast, in the dividend exclusion method of integration, the
dividend is simply not included in the income of the equity holder. The
dividend exclusion method leaves the liability for tax on distributed profits
at the entity level where it is imposed at a uniform rate without reference
to the marginal tax rate of the shareholder who receives the income
distribution. 84 The same amount of tax is paid on the dividend (by the
entity) whether the equity holder's other income is $10 or $10,000,000.
The shareholder credit method reaches a different result. It is .the equity
owner's marginal tax rate or ability to pay that ultimately determines the
amount of tax that will be due on the profits of the enterprise.
Thus the integrated corporate tax is similar to pass-through taxation in
that it is a one-tier tax on distributed profits of the enterprise. Depending
on the method chosen, an integrated corporate tax may resemble passthrough taxation even more closely. The shareholder credit method of
integration generally taxes distributed profits at the individual tax rates of
the equity owners, in much the same way they would be taxed on those
profits on the pass-through model. But integrated corporate taxation differs
from pass-through in important respects. In an integrated corporate tax, the
entity is still generally regarded as a separate taxpayer and neither losses
owned, extends the shareholder credit even when no corporate level tax is due on the
distributed profits. See AULT, supra note 72, at 289.
82. Warren, REPORTER'S STUDY, supra note 16, at 50.
83. Comparing this result to the example in the preceding section of the impact of the
classical corporate tax, a total of $396 would be payable upon the $1,000 of corporate
profits available for distribution using a shareholder credit approach instead of the $604
due in the two tier tax. The $396 would be collected as follows. The $350 initially paid
by the entity would be credited against the equity holders' individual tax liability. But,
assuming the equity holder pays taJl at the (highest) 39.6% marginal tax rate, she would
owe more tax. She receives $650 in cash but would be regarded as having received a
dividend of $1,000 much as a wage earner is treated as having income equal to the sum
of his take-home pay and the amount of tax withheld from the paycheck. Hence the equity
owner owes an additional $46 in tax on the distribution.
84. Warren, supra note 79, at 741-44. The use of a flat rate final withholding tax to
reduce the shareholder level tax on dividends produces a similar outcome since the
dividend income is not taxed at the equity holder's individual marginal rate but at an
independently chosen fixed rate. For this reason, the flat rate final withholding systems
of Hungary and Romania are treated as variants of the dividend exclusion method in the
discussion infra notes 96-97, 105-06 and accompanying text.

456

N.Y.L. SeH. J. INT'L & COMPo L.

[Vol. 17

nor retained earnings flow through to the equity owners as these items do
in pass-through taxation. Losses generally remain with the enterprise in
integrated corporate taxation. 85

B. Summary
Overall, pass-through taxation has a very limited structural role in
most of the tax systems surveyed. In five of the six symposium countries,
virtually all business forms that a privately held enterprise may use are
classified as corporate taxpayers. The few business structures that are
taxed on a pass-through basis appear to be of limited application. In South
Africa, the one panel country in which a broad range of partnership
business forms are taxed on a pass-through basis, these entities generally
are restricted to a rather small number of owners. The four trading
partner countries present a more mixed picture. Japan follows the
dominant pattern of tax classification seen in the panel countries. In
France and the United Kingdom, pass-through taxation is applicable to a
range of partnership forms but with substantial restrictions of different
sortS. 86 In the fourth of the trading partners, Germany, pass-through
taxation has a larger structural role and there is one business form that
provides both limited liability and pass-through taxation to all owners and
can be publicly traded to some extent. Yet this pass-through entity does not
appear to be the dominant business form even among privately held
enterprises.
C. Findings

1. Public Trading as a Criteria for Tax Classification
In contrast to the current mode in tax law in the United States, public
trading and private holding of ownership interests is not a direct criteria in

85. How significant these differences are in practice depends upon the corporate and
individual tax rates and the actual loss flow through rules. Some models of integration
discussed in the literature, such as the shareholder allocation method, come closer to passthrough taxation. See TREASURY 1992, supra note 16, at 27-38; Warren, REPORTER'S
STUDY, supra note 67, at 47-50. The Subchapter S tax system is the only "complete"
corporate tax integration noted in the literature. See Schenk, supra note 79, at 698.
86. The term "partnership" is used in U.S. law, as well as in the United Kingdom and
South Africa. To the extent the term is used in this article to refer to business forms in
other countries, the author is following the conventional translations used in the tax and
business law literature.
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the tax classification process in any of the countries surveyed. In all the tax
systems examined, tax classification of businesses ordinarily is based upon
the business form used. The issue is determined on a generic basis for all
taxpayers using a particular business form, without regard to individual
characteristics of capital structure, ownership, or optional features of
organizational structure. 87
Typically, in the countries in the survey, authorizing statutes designate
which business forms may be publicly traded and which are reserved for
private ownership.
This is sometimes accomplished by a direct
authorization 88 or a ban on issuing shares to the public 89 and sometimes by
means of a limit on the number of owners that is permitted. 90 For the few
business forms that may be used with both kinds of capital structures,
public trading does not alter the normal tax classification. 91 For example,
whether an S.A. in Mexico is publicly traded or privately held, it will still
be treated as a corporation for tax purposes.92

87. See AULT, supra note 72, at 289-92, for discussion of methods of tax classification
outside the U.S. In some instances, the nature of activities carried on by the entity can
lead to what amounts to a redesignation of the entity for tax and business law purposes.
An example of this is seen in France where civil companies which by form would be
classified as partnerships will be designated as corporate taxpayers if they engage in certain
commercial activities.
C.Gen.lmp.Art.206(1) (Editions Dalloz 1993). This is a
classification based on activities, not attributes. See SIMEON MOQUET BORDE, DOING
BUSINESS IN FRANCE § 5.07 [I][c][ii] (Matthew Bender 1985). Similarly, in France, as
in other countries, use of a business form for an activity that is not a business enterprise,
such as a residential real estate cooperative, can result in reclassification by special
exception. See Business Operations in France, 961 Tax Mgmt. (BNA) A-I, A-66 (1995);
See infra note 124, for discussion of the role of limited liability in tax outcome.
88. South Africa authorizes a public limited company to issue shares to the public. Ch.
V of Companies Act 61 of 1973 ISRA. English company law takes the same approach.
89. See DOING BUSINESS IN HUNGARY, supra note 76, at 87; see also Katherine Ashton
& Dr. Zsuzsa Kovacs, Corporate DeveLopment in Emerging Nations: Hungary, 17 N.Y.L.
SCH. 1. INT'L & COMPo L 329 (1997). Hungary prohibits the limited liability company
form, the Kft from issuing interests to the public.
90. The Limitada in Argentina is restricted to 50 owners. Dobson, supra note 76; see
also Atchabahain, Business Operations in Argentina, 950 Tax Mgmt. (BNA) A-23 (1997).
91. Generally the joint stock company business form can be used either as a publicly
traded company or as a privately held one. Another form that can be used either way is
the limited partnership form that issues shares, called the societe en commandite par
actions (KGaA in Germany) in the civil law countries. This entity is classified as a
corporate taxpayer in Germany to the extent of the limited partnership interests and as a
corporation in France. The form is reported to be rarely used. See BORDE, supra note 87,
§ 5.05[2][b]; STROBL, KILLIUS & VORBRUGG, BUSINESS LAW GUIDE To GERMANY <j[ 421
(CCH 1988).
92. The Sociedade A nonima (S.A.) is required to have at least two shareholders. PRICE
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Similarly, the German limited partnership form known as the GmbH
& Co. KG is taxed on a partnership basis whether it is privately held or

publicly traded. This business form is the only one found in the survey
that combined pass-through taxation with the potential for being publicly
traded. 93 All the other business forms noted in the survey that are
classified as pass-through taxpayers appear to be ineligible to be publicly
traded to any extent. 94
Only one example was found of an alternative tax classification
becoming applicable on an elective basis to a particular business form as
a result of voluntarily restricting the identity of owners, as is the case in
the United States with the S corporation. In France, the SARL, which is
one of the limited liability company business forms, may elect pass-through
taxation if it engages in certain specified industrial activities and is owned
by a family group.95
2. Business Forms and Tax Classification
Having found that business form is the determinant of tax
classification in the countries covered by the survey, the next question was
which tax models applied to which business forms. The findings on this
question are grouped as follows:

Group 1: Countries in which general partnerships are classified as
corporate taxpayers.

WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN MEXICO 77 (1993).
Minimum shareholder
requirements are typical for joint stock companies. South Africa and South Korea both
require at least seven shareholders. PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN SOUTH
AFRICA 85 (1990); PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN SOUTH KOREA 66-67 (1992).

93. See Business Transactions in Germany § 22.05[1] (Bernd R41uster gen. ed.,
Matthew Bender 1996).
94. See supra note 91 and infra note 112 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
KGaA and SCA which may be publicly traded and are pass-throughs as far as the general
partner is concerned but not for the limited partners.

a

95. Societe Responsibilitee Limiree. The French family SARL is only eligible for the
partnership classification election so long as ownership remains within the family.
However, reclassification back to the normal corporate taxpayer status in such a case is not
a question of public trading because all SARLs are restricted to 50 shareholders. Business
Operations in France, supra note 87, at A-IS to 16. The EURL (Enterprise Unipersonnelle
Responsibilitee Limitee) which is the one owner limited liability company, is classified
as a "nothing" or direct taxpayer and is permitted to elect corporate taxation. C.Gen.lmp.
Art. 206(3), 239.

a
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Group 2: Countries that classify general partnerships as pass-throughs
and also tax some limited liability structures on a pass-through
basis.
Group 3: A category of one country that does not fit either of these
patterns.
Group 1
In five of the six symposium countries, Hungary, Romania, Argentina,
Mexico, and South Korea, all of the major business forms are classified as
corporate taxpayers. Included within this category are general and limited
partnerships, joint ventures, joint stock companies, and limited liability
companies. Sole proprietors are an important exception and are taxed
directly. In these countries, the pass-through model is either not a feature
of the business tax system at all or is applied only to business entities and
arrangements with limited commercial usage.
Specifically, in Hungary all the recognized business forms are
classified as corporate taxpayers. 96 Romania takes almost as extreme an
approach but recognizes a number of silent partnership business forms that
are classified as pass-throughs. 97 The only business form that is not taxed
as a corporation in Mexico is the A. en P. or contract joint venture. The A.
en P. is not recognized as a separate taxpayer and income and losses pass
through to the managing venturer as well as the silent partners. 98 Similarly,
in South Korea all business forms except the contractual partnership (chop)

96. Ashton & Kovacs, supra note 89. Gabriella Erods & Maria Veghelyi, Taxation and
Investment in Hungary, § 5.1 (lBFD Eur. Tax'n, June 30, 1997). Sole proprietors are
taxed directly and their activity seems to be referred to as "small private ventures" in the
literature. See lldiko Ekes, Hungary Plans to Introduce Amendments to Tax System, 12
TAX NOTES INT'L 2020, (June 24, 1996). The current tax rate structures in Hungary
results in a lower overall tax on business profits of corporations than of sole proprietors
even after distribution. See Daniel Deak & Richard Krever, Company and Shareholder Tax
Refonn in Hungary, 13 TAX NOTES INT'L 1811 (Nov. 25, 1996). It is on the basis of this
outcome that the Hungarian corporate tax is included within the expansive definition of
integration as a less than double tax.
97. Drd loan Condor, Taxation and Investment in Romania, §§ 4.2, 4.3.2 (IBFD Eur.
Tax'n, June 16, 1997). See id. §§ 2.8.1,2.8.2 for a discussion of the silent partnership and
civil law business forms in Romania.
98. Although the A. en P. (association en participation) is not a juridical person, the
silent partners (asociados) do not have general liability. Only the managing joint venturer
(asociante) has liability to third parties. DOING BUSINESS IN MEXICO, supra note 92, at 84.
Prior to the income tax regulations issued on January 31, 1997, the managing venturer was
the only party with direct liability for the tax and had to look to contractual rights for
reimbursement from the co-venturers. Mexico's Income Tax Regulation, 97 TAX NOTES
INT'L 21-25 (Jan. 31, 1997).
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are corporate taxpayers. The chop is a pass-through taxpayer like the A.
en p.99 These various silent partnerships are more akin to financing
arrangements than to active enterprises. loo
Although Argentina now follows the pattern seen in Mexico, Hungary,
Romania and South Korea of treating all major business forms including
partnerships and limited liability companies as corporate taxpayers, this is
a very recent development. Until the tax. reform enacted in September
1996, partnerships and the limitada or limited liability company in
Argentina were taxed on a pass-through basis. Argentina's business tax
policy was an exception to the prevailing pattern of taxation of limited
liability companies in South America. lol The 1996 tax reforms reclassified
a wide range of business forms, including general partnerships, as
corporate taxpayers. 102
But, while all five of these countries classify their partnerships and
limited liability companies as corporations, in none of them are the profits
of corporate taxpayers subject to the full double tax of the classical
corporate tax model. In each of the countries, a form of corporate tax
integration eliminates or moderates one of the two levels of tax seen in the
classical corporate tax regime. In Mexico l03 and Argentina,I04 the
shareholder level tax is eliminated fully through the dividend exclusion
method. In Romania l05 and Hungary,106 the shareholders are taxed on

99. Baskerville & Kim, supra note 76, at A-9.
100. For example, the statutory definition of the A. en P. is "a contract whereby a
person grants others that render him goods or services, a participation in the profits and
losses of a mercantile business or in one of several commercial transactions." Mexico's
Income Tax Regulation, supra note 98.
101. See supra note 74.
102. Dobson, supra note 76. The category of business forms described as sociedades
de personas was reclassified as corporate taxpayers with effect for the tax years ending
from September 27, 1996. Nicasio Del Castillo et aI., Tax Reform Law Approved in
Argentina, 14 TAX NOTES INT'L 269 (Jan. 27, 1997). See also supra note 73.
103. If the amount distributed exceeds the distributing entity's after tax net earnings,
an equalization tax is imposed at the company level. DOING BUSINESS IN MEXICO, supra
note 92, at 139; Nicasio Del Castillo & Manuel F. Solano, Business Operations In Mexico,
972 Tax Mgmt. (BN A) A6-AS (1995). From 1983 through 1988, a deduction for
dividends paid was allowed the distributing entity and the dividends were taxed to the
shareholder. But effective in 1989, the entity level tax relief for dividends paid was ended
and the shareholder or owner level relief was substituted. Id.
104. Del Castillo, supra note 102, at 270; see also Atchabahian, supra note 90, at A-37.
105. At present Romania provides some profits integration for distributions to individual
shareholders in the form of a withholding tax at a flat (and reduced rate) on corporate
dividends. The withholding tax is a final withholding tax, which means shareholders owe
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dividends but at a reduced rate through the mechanism of a flat rate final
withholding tax and a moderate amount of integration is achieved. Starting
in 1991, South Korea began implementing an integrated tax using the
shareholder credit method and since 1994 has kept the credit at the level
necessary to achieve fully integrated taxation of dividends. lo7
Of the four trading partner countries, only Japan replicates the tax
classification patterns seen in the symposium countries. In Japan, general
partnerships, joint stock companies, limited partnerships and all other
business entities recognized in the Japanese Commercial Code are taxed as
corporations.
There are some silent partnerships and contractual
relationships that are not based upon the Commercial Code and these
business forms are taxed on a pass-through basis. In practice, these passthrough structures are reported to be little used in Japan.IOS The Japanese
corporate tax is no longer a fully integrated tax but does provide some
relief from the full burden of a double tax. 109
Group 2
Two of the trading partner countries, Germany and the United
Kingdom, and one of the panel countries, South Africa, fall into this group.

no more tax on the dividend than the amount already withheld. Condor, supra note 97, §
5.5.
106. Hungary is in the midst of a corporate tax revision to try to make its corporate tax
system more compatible with investment goals and tax credit concerns of foreign investors.
If revised as recently proposed, the Hungarian corporate tax system would continue to
favor incorporated as compared with sole proprietor status. Corporate taxpayers in Hungary
pay lower taxes on distributed as well as undistributed profits than do sole traders. Deak
& Krever, supm note 96. In Hungary, dividends paid to individual shareholders are subject
to a flat, reduced rate final withholding tax that is creditable against other tax liability up
to a fixed amount. DOING BUSINESS IN HUNGARY, supm note 76, at 140; Erods &
Veghelyi, supm note 96, § 6.3(b). Since 1995 the corporate tax has been a split rate tax
imposing a basic tax on profits when earned and a supplementary tax when profits are
distributed. Erods & Veghelyi, supm note 96, §§ 5, 5.1; Maria Veghelyi, Moving Toward
a New Corporate Tax System, (IBFD Eur. Tax'n., Apr. I, 1995).
107. Baskerville & Kim, supra note 76, § VII. B.
108. DELOITfE AND TOUCHE LLP, JAPAN §§ 9.04, 12.01, 12.02, available in LEXIS;
Takashi Kuboi & Yoichi Asakawa, Partnen·ng in Japan: Fonn of Entry and Recent Tax
Issues, 13 TAX NOTES INT'L 445, 446 (Aug. 5, 1996). See also AULT, supra note 72, at
356.
109. Japan uses a shareholder credit and provides tax relief in the form of elective
application of a final, reduced rate withholding tax. AULT, supra note 72, at 289;
DELOITfE AND TOUCHE LLP, supm note 108, §§ 15.03, 15.06. Prior to the 1987 tax
reforms, Japan had a full shareholder credit system of corporate tax integration.
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Of the thr~e, pass-through taxation has the greatest structural role in the
German system.
In South Africa, all of the company business forms are classified as
corporate taxpayers, including unlimited liability companies. On the other
hand, partnerships of all types, including general partnerships, joint
ventures and three kinds of limited partnerships, are classified for taxation
on a pass-through basis. However, the use of the various partnership forms
is substantially restricted by the limitation on the number of partners that
each may have. Commercial partnerships are restricted to a maximum of
20 partners. I 10
This pattern is seen in the United Kingdom as well. There, the limited
company form-both with and without the public trading election-is
classified as a corporate taxpayer while general and limited partnerships are
taxed on a pass-through basis. As in South Africa, the number of partners
for both general and limited partnerships is held to 20. An exception is
made in both countries for partnerships practicing law and other learned
professions. Limited partnerships are not widely used. Only 3,600 limited
partnerships were reported to be registered in the United Kingdom in recent
years.111
German tax law follows the classification pattern seen in the United
Kingdom and South Africa but German business law does not impose the
same stringent limitations on the use of partnership business forms. One of
the limited partnership forms, discussed below, is particularly important
and silent partnership arrangements of two different kinds are prevalent
both as financing and tax shelter vehicles. All are treated as tax passthroughs.112
In Germany, the limited partnership with sole corporate general
partner, called the GmbH & Co. KG, is a highly developed and widely
used business form. m It has been accepted as a business form at least
since 1922.114 To a great extent it is viewed as the legal equivalent of the

110. DOING BUSINESS IN SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 92, at 136, 159, 199,201.
Ill. DELOITTE AND TOUCHE, LLP, UNITED KINGDOM §§ 7.02, 8.04, available in
LEXIS.
112. Business Operations in Gennany, 962 Tax Mgmt. (BNA) A-12, A-13 to -38
(1995); lorg-Ditrich Kramer, Taxation of Interest Paid By U.S. A typical Silent Partnership
to a German Silent Partner, 12 TAX NOTES INT'L 385 (Feb. 5, 1996)(describing the typical
and atypical silent partnerships structures); STROBL, supra note 91, at 'I 421. But the

KGaA, another limited partnership, is only taxed as a pass-through to the extent of the
general partners' interests.

113. See infra note 116.
114. A 1922 decision of the Gennan Supreme Court is cited as recognizing the GmbH
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GmbH or limited liability company business form. I IS The limited liability
company is taxed as a corporation while the GmbH & Co. KG is a tax
pass-through. Nonetheless, the GmbH & Co. KG runs very far behind the
limited liability company in use. 116
All three countries have adopted an integrated corporate tax of some
kind. South Africa gives shareholders a complete dividend exclusion. 117
Germany achieves full integration through a shareholder credit. lls The
United Kingdom provides a moderate amount of integration through its
shareholder credit system, known as the ACT. 119

& Co KG as a business form in use. BUSINESS TRANSACfIONS IN GERMANY, supra note
93, § 22.05[1]. The limited partnership with sole corporate general partner is an adaptation
that restricts general liability to whatever assets the corporation contains. This business
form was used extensi vely in the U oited States in the tax shelters of the 1970' sand 1980' s.
See, e.g., Larson, 66 T.e. 159.
115. For a discussion of the status of the GmbH & Co. KG in German commercial law,
see Strobl, supra note 91, <J[ 420, (1988) referring to 1981 Commercial Code amendments.
See also Heribert Hirte, The European Private Company: A Gennan Perspective, in THE
EUROPEAN PRIVATE COMANY? 100 (Harm-Jan De Kluiver & Walter Van Gerven eds.,
1995), discussing the German response to the extension of the Fourth Directive of the
European Union, which established financial disclosure standards, in 90/6051EEC. There
has been a protracted dispute with the European Union concerning the applicability of
requirements for publication of financial accounts of businesses operating in the GmbH &
Co. KG form on the grounds of its functional resemblance to the GmbH limited liability
company form.
116. In 1991, the number of GmbH & Co. KG registered in Germany was
approximately 93,000 as compared to about 372,000 regular GmbH's. For that year it is
reported that there were 465,650 German GmbH's and 20% were sole general partners in
a GmbH & Co KG. A total of 200,000 partnerships of aJl types, including GmbH & Co.
KG were reported. Numerous commentators have referred to the GmbH & Co KG as a
tax shelter vehicle and it is permitted to be publicly traded to some extent. Hirte, supra
note 115, at 96-97, 100.
117. This exclusion in South Africa was extended to individual shareholders in 1990.
DOING BUSINESS IN SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 92, at 130. The post-apartheid Katz Report
recommended the continuation of this system and the split rate corporate tax which
effectively reduces taxation on retained earnings as well. Commission of Inquiry into
Certain Aspects of the Tax Structure of South Africa, Commission of Inquiry Into Certain
Aspects of the Tax Structure of South Africa Issues Intenn Report, Dated December 9,
1994,95 TAX NOTES INT'L 34-22 (Feb. 21, 1995) [hereinafter The Katz Report].
118. Business Operations in Germany, supra note 112, at A-24; The Taxation of
Companies in Europe, TlI 161,662 (IBFD, October 1994). The Petersburg Tax Reform
Proposal submitted by the German government's Tax Reform Committee would retain this
system. See Eugen BogenschUtz, Gennany Embarks on Sweeping Tax Refonn Program,
14 TAX NOTES INT'L 655 (Feb. 24, 1997); See also AULT, supra note 72, at 287.
119. TREASURY 1992, supra note 16, app. B at 181. See also, AULT, supra note 72, at
288. Auit reports a residual corporate level tax of 16%. Id. at 353.
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Group 3
France follows neither pattern. General partnerships are classified as
pass-through taxpayers but most partnership forms are permitted to elect
corporate tax status. 120 Limited partnerships have a dual status, being
treated as pass-throughs to the extent of the general partners' interests and
as corporations to the extent of the interests of the limited partners. Silent
partnerships also have this dual status. 121 The joint stock company and all
the limited liability company business forms are designated as corporate
taxpayers. 122 But family owned limited liability companies in certain
industries are permitted to elect pass-through taxation. 123
If there is a pattern in French entity classification, it is that corporate
taxation follows limited liability through all business forms except when
an alternative election is provided. 124 In France, only general partners
participate as pass-through taxpayers. Thus, structurally, the pass-through
method of taxation should be regarded as available only on a very
restricted basis. To complete the report on French entity classification,
France has long had corporate tax integration through shareholder credits
and currently has fully integrated the taxation of distributed profits. 125

120. Business Operations in France, supra note 87, at A-33, -65, -66. Among the
numerous business forms eligible to make this election are the general partnership (SNC),
limited partnership (SCS), silent partnership (SP), civil companies and de facto companies.
The EURL also is eligible to make this election. Other eligible entities include agricultural
companies but real estate co-proprietors do not have this privilege. c.Gen.lmp., Arts.
206(3), 206(8), 239(modifie).
121. BORDE, supra note 87, § 5.10 [3][c).
122. Business Operations in France, supra note 87, at A-33, -65, -66.
123. An SARL that is engaged in industrial, commercial or crafts activities and is
owned by a family group is eligible to make this election. Business Operations in France,
supra note 87, at A-66; C.Gen.lrnp. 239(3). This election became available in 1955 and
seems similar in spirit to the S corporation election of similar vintage in the U.S. Both
were added to a classical two-tier tax system to assist family owned businesses before
corporate tax integration became the dominant trend that it is today. See JCS-16-95, II C.
(Legislative Background); see also McNulty, supra note 21, at 1-2.
124. French tax law clearly has deviated from the classification method of treating
juridical persons as separate taxpayers, which appears to be the approach in Germany, the
United Kingdom and South Africa. Compare AULT, supra note 72, at 289 -92, with J. LE
GALL, FRENCH COMPANY LAW 15, 18, 26, 28, 29 (Robert R. Pennington ed., 1974)
(discussing separate legal personality of French business forms).
125. As of 1995, the French system of corporate tax integration through credits and
imputation resulted in full integration, (i.e., no residual corporate tax on distributed profits).
AULT, supra note 72, at 288. Only a moderate amount integration was found at the time
of the Treasury study. TREASURY 1992, supra note 16, app. B at 167; Philippe Moisand
& Frank Dierckx (revised by Gauthier Blanuet & M-A. Bouzoraa), The Taxation of
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D. More Questions
This small survey does not provide enough data for broad statistical
extrapolation nor enough detail to measure relative tax burdens. But if
definitive conclusions cannot yet be drawn, some patterns seen in these
findings merit comment and suggest further questions.
1. Patterns
The corporate tax model emerges as the dominant method of taxation
of privately held entities in this structural survey, with pass-through
taxation running a very distant second. There are clear indications that
integrated corporate taxation serves as a substitute for pass-through taxation
of privately held entities both in the group of emerging and transitional
market countries and among the mature tax systems as well. Moreover,
the pattern of limiting the structural role of pass-through taxation is seen
both in countries with full corporate tax integration and countries with only
partial integration.
Transitional and emerging market countries may be limiting the role
of pass-through taxation because of the inherent complexity of
implementation and the administrative burdens that it adds in comparison
to entity level taxation. If tax on earnings of the enterprise must be
collected from a myriad of owners rather than from the enterprise itself,
more individual tax returns must be filed and more taxpayers pursued than
if the entity were a corporate taxpayer. Building a culture of tax
compliance is one of the central tasks faced by most transitional and
emerging market countries in implementing their new tax systems and ease
of collection and administration may be important priorities. For these
reasons, one group of influential advisors suggests a tax code for
transitional economies that both steers businesses away from pass-through
taxation by keeping individual and integrated corporate tax rates in sync
and limits the role of pass-through entities structurally by restricting it to
enterprises owned by very small groups of natural persons. 126

Companies in France, paras. 189,886 (IBFD Eur. Tax'n, Oct. 17, 1995). France from
1989 to 1991 had a split rate corporate tax that imposed a lower rate of tax on retained
earnings. A preferential rate now applies to long term capital gains that are retained.
c.Gen.Imp., Art. 39 dudodecies (3).
126. HUSSEY & LUBICK, supra note 6, at vii-ix, 34-35 (section 12 of the Basic World
Tax Code), 226, 264-65 (top individual tax rate of 30% and flat corporate tax rate of 30%
with full advance corporate tax credit method of integration).
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The limited use of pass-through taxation in the four trading partner
countries may also reflect a decision to avoid the complexity and
administrative burden of pass-through taxation. 127 Yet the business tax
systems of all four of these countries are highly developed and tolerate
quite a lot of complexity. A perhaps more compelling explanation may be
that when integrated corporate taxation is the alternative, there is little
interest on the part of taxpayers in having a going concern tax.ed on a
pass-through basis. Where pass-through taxation does not uniquely offer
the advantage of a one-tier tax, it may have limited appeal.
The French corporate tax election for partnerships appears to support
this hypothesis. At a minimum, the existence of this election suggests that
when an integrated corporate tax is available, pass-through taxation is not
always chosen by active businesses. The European Union (hereinafter
"EO") advanced the idea of such an election a number of years ago and
in 1994 recommended that its member states give sole proprietors and
partnerships the choice of being treated as corporate taxpayers. In its
program to develop small and medium sized businesses, the EO has
concluded that the direct (or pass-through) taxation of retained earnings at
progressive individual tax rates is a stumbling block for privately held
businesses for which reinvested earnings are the principal source of
capital. 128 The implication of these elections seems to be that some
businesses are willing to trade the possibility of a loss pass-through for the
opportunity to defer a portion of the taxes on retained eamings. 129

127. To extent that pass-through taxation is used in these countries, the actual systems
of pass-through taxation appear to be a good deal simpler than that seen in the U.S. at least
in partnership taxation. See AUL"f, supra note 72, at 354-66.
128. Commission Recommendation of 25 May 1994 Concerning the Taxation of Small
and Medium-Sized Enterprises, 1994 0.1. (L 177) 1; The improvement of the Fiscal
Environment of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, 1994 OJ. (C 187) 5 also reported
in, 1994 O.J. (C 204) 2; John Iekel, The Tax Treatment of SMEs in the European Union,
95 Tax Notes Int'I 68-8, at n.16 (Apr. 10, 1995).
129. Germany, which has a fully integrated corporate tax system of long standing, also
gives pass-through taxation the broadest role seen in any of the ten countries. This can
perhaps be explained by history and chronology. The GmbH & Co. KG was already an
entrenched business form for more than 40 years before Germany adopted an integrated
corporate tax. It may have been difficult to dislodge it. But it is noteworthy that while
it appears to be a well-used business form, the GmbH & Co. KG has not supplanted the
GmbH, which is the corporate ta"payer business form that it so closely resembles. In the
United States, there are nearly as many S cOqJorations as there are C cOqJorations- In
Germany, the regular GmbH outnumbers the GmbH & Co. KG by four to one. The
greater use of the GmbH in practice seems to support the theory advanced here that when
a fully integrated corporate income tax is available, pass-through taxation is not necessarily
preferred, especially by enterprises engaged in industrial and commercial businesses. As
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Where the two-tier corporate tax is not a factor, entity taxation may
also be preferred to pass-through by operating businesses in general
because it simplifies decision making for the enterprise. Entity level
taxation of retained earnings in effect insulates realization and reinvestment
decisions from conflicts over taxation among the owners, who in passthrough regimes would be influenced by the impact of these decisions on
their individual tax liabilities as well as the effect on the business. This
separate tax identity thus reinforces the separate identity of the enterprise.
From this point of view, the corporate models favored by the countries
surveyed may appeal to business managers. 130
2. Trends
The findings of this survey indicate that the structural role of passthrough taxation is much more limited in the tax systems surveyed than it
now is in the United States and that it is not expanding in those other
countries. There is some suggestion that its role may be shrinking.
The choices made in entity classification in the recently reconstructed
tax systems in Hungary and Romania, two countries with transitional
economies that were included in the symposium, are particularly
interesting. In thinking about business law and business taxation, these
countries have had the benefit of the advice and the examples of Western
European systems as well as that of the United States. Their decision to
avoid pass-through taxation for business entities is noteworthy. Likewise,
the broad business tax reform enacted in Japan in 1987 did not enlarge the
role of pass-through taxation in that country. The South African self-study
of its business tax policy conducted in 1994 contained no indication that
an expansion of pass-through taxation was even considered. 131 Argentina,
which put a business tax reform program in place in 1996, substituted its
integrated corporate tax for the previous pass-through method applied to
partnership and limited liability company business forms. The French
creation of an election into corporate taxation for pass-through taxpayers
suggests that there is interest in substituting an integrated corporate tax for
pass-through taxation in French tax policy as well.

noted above, the GmbH & Co. KG is sometimes referred to as a tax shelter vehicle. See
infra note 116.
130. See Hideki & Levmore, supra note 46.
13I. The Katz Report, supra note 117.
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IV. SOME OBSERVATIONS

The emergence of pass-through taxation as the norm for privately held
enterprises in the United States leaves U.S. business tax policy in a curious
posture. From the point of view of avoiding the two-tier tax, U.S.
treatment of privately held enterprises now more closely resembles taxation
of such businesses in other countries. Most countries long ago moved
away from the classical two-tier corporate tax model for businesses. The
new entity classification regulations and expanded Subchapter S legislation
of 1996 make it possible for virtually all privately held businesses to
choose to be taxed on a single tier basis without resorting to the self-help
techniques of the past. In this, the United States seems to have moved
closer to its trading partners, new and old. Yet in the comparative law
context, it is clear that the United States has chosen an unusual means to
this end.
The United States is making a structural commitment to tax privately
held businesses on the pass-through model at a time when other countries
appear to be moving away from this approach to taxation. In September
1996, while the new regulations that classify the U.S. limited liability
companies as partnerships were pending at the U.S. Treasury, Argentina
enacted a tax reform that reclassified its partnerships and limited liability
companies as corporate taxpayers. At least among the countries examined
in the survey reported here, recent revisions and re-examinations of
business taxation have produced systems in which pass-through taxation
has a very minor structural role.
From a comparative law perspective, the structural choices made by
the symposium and trading partner countries in their systems of business
taxation demonstrate that the pass-through model is by no means the only
answer to the question of how to design a one level tax for privately held
entities. The integrated corporate tax model is the answer that many other
countries have chosen. In recent years, the debate over an integrated
corporate tax in the United States has focused on the question of whether
it is preferable to the classical two-tier corporate tax. The economic
inefficiencies and biases in the double tax have been well and thoroughly
explored and the advantages of integration as a replacement for the
classical system continue to be studied and weighed. 132 The pattern of
taxation of privately held entities reported in this survey suggests that
integration should be re-examined from a different perspective: as a
132. For a discussion of these issues, see TREASURY 1992, supra note 16; Warren,
REPORTER'S STUDY, supra note 16. See also Emil M. Sunley, Corporate Integration: An
Economic Perspective, 47 TAX L. REV. 621 (1992).
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potential solution to the widely observed problems with pass-through
taxation in the U.S. experience.
U.S. business taxation has drifted toward the pass-through model in an
unexamined way. For taxpayers the reasons seem plain enough. The
existing partnership and Subchapter S tax methods have offered the only
escape from the double tax of the traditional corporate tax regime. The
lure of loss pass-through and tax shelters is clear as well. But from a
systemic point of view, it is not such an obvious choice. Pass-through
taxation clearly adds considerable complexity to U.S. tax law as well as
muhipJying collection issues. Some of the complexity comes from efforts
to contain abuses, which still seem to flourish notwithstanding. Indeed, the
thicket of regulatory responses to partnership tax problems is so dense that
it may encourage further tax evasion; tax administrators cannot readily find
even their own way through it.
But a great deal of the complexity of pass-through taxation is inherent
in the idea of trying to equate the taxation of the many and varied
participations in an entity with the tax treatment of direct ownership. U.S.
partnership tax law may be an extreme example,133 but it illustrates the
quandary of how far to take the concept of pass-through taxation once its
premises are accepted, and how susceptible the pass-through model can be
to tax avoidance schemes. While we may not be facing the task of
creating a culture of tax compliance that transitional and emerging market
countries have before them, the imperative to maintain an ethos of
voluntary compliance remains central to U.S. tax policy goals. Any tax
system that ignores the concerns of tax administration and compliance and
tolerates abuses which undermine fairness, does so at its own peril.
The idea of an integrated corporate tax for privately held businesses
in the United States is an attractive alternative for several reasons.
Integration offers relief from the double tax on distributed profits, which
seems to be the goal of much tax planning for entities. l34 At the same

133. See AULT, supra note 72, at 355 for a discussion of partnership taxation in other
mature tax systems.
134. Arguably, a defacto system of corporate tax integration for privately held
corporations existed before the repeal ofInternal Revenue Code section 337 in 1986. The
earnings stripping techniques of distributing earnings to owner/operators as salary and
interest payments eliminated the corporate level tax on current distributions and resulted
in tax being paid by shareholders at their personal rates. Similarly, old section 337
allowed the sale of the business in liquidation to be taxed at the marginal rates of the
shareholders and excused the corporation from tax on the transaction. For a discussion of
the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine, see 1986 Blue Book, supra note 64, at 328-54.
The same tax bill that ended this defacto integration also commissioned the review of
corporate taxation that resulted in the 1992 Treasury study of formal integration.
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time, an integrated corporate tax might well be simpler than the U.S.
versions of pass-through taxation. 13S Difficult and contentious areas of
U.S. tax law such as the inside and outside basis adjustment rules would
no longer be necessary.136 The need to regulate loss pass through would
also be obviated. Losses do not flow through to owners in the typical
integrated corporate tax. If loss pass through ceased to be a concern in
U.S. tax law, numerous provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and
voluminous regulations could be eliminated. With integrated taxation of
privately held entities, substantial simplification of the Internal Revenue
Code might become a more attainable goal. In this connection, one of the
most interesting lessons from the comparative law survey is that so many
business taxpayers in other countries are apparently willing to forgo loss
pass-through in the taxation of privately held businesses.
The comparative law context suggests that U.S. tax policy toward
privately held businesses is oddly configured. Pass-through taxation clearly
was not chosen as the norm in the United States because it improves tax
administration or, despite occasiomil protestations to the contrary, because
of its perceived theoretical virtues. . It represents instead a cumulative
movement along a path of least political resistance. If pass-through
taxation of closely held businesses has been permitted to grow to its
present stature largely because it is popular with the taxpayers who directly
benefit from it, a more considered justification should be required to raise
it to the level of positive national tax policy. A thoughtful examination of
its systemic benefits and costs is necessary. The Symposium has made
clear that a consideration of the alternatives in use beyond our shores
should form a part· of this review;
Although it seems reluctant to do so, Congress should respond to the
new entity classification regulations. The wiser course for Congress might
well be for it to treat the new regulations as opening up the question of tax
policy for privately held businesses rather than closing it off. An
integrated corporate tax for privately held· businesses is an alternative that
should be given serious consideration. The reinvention of the taxation of

135. Se~ TREASURY 1992, supra not~ 16; Warren, REPORTER'S STUDY, supra note 16,
on the issue of complexity of methods of integration and the host of issues, including
streaming of dividends and preservation of corporate tax benefits that arise in an integrated
system. See also Shuldiner, supra note 72, on the risks of adopting integration as a
replacement for the classical corporate income tax.
136. The taxation of capital gains, which can be a deferred second-tier tax, is dealt with
in the various integrated corporate tax systems in different ways, ranging from full taxation
to complete exclusion. See supra note 68 for recent tax literature concerning various
aspects of the basis issue.

1997]

SQUARE WHEELS

471

privately held entities in the United States on the pass-through model may
have left us with a square wheel and we could be in for an unnecessarily
bumpy ride. Our neighbors in the global marketplace have shown us that
there are other designs that we could be using.

